To turn Adversity into Advantage, Banks need to Renovate in Winter

Renovate in Winter

To turn Adversity into Advantage, Banks need to Renovate in Winter

by Ben Robinson | March 30, 2020 | 8 minutes read

Crisis is not the time to stop all IT projects, but to double down on the ones that really matter.

Don’t pull up the drawbridge

Beware risk and opportunity cost

Bag some quick wins

Enterprise Software Stack Systems of Intelligence
How the Banking Enterprise Software stack is splitting

Consider Impact on the future

The Future of Banking
The Future of Banking and the Strategic Imperative

This a data play. It requires understanding customer context (interaction preferences, financial situation, needs) and be able to match to the right offering. In the first instance, financial services companies will do this for their own labelled services, but increasingly — to maximize utility and convenience — they’ll need to do it for third-parties services as well (requiring an extensible product catalog) and intermediating and bundling if necessary (which necessitates managing real-time risk). As a third phase, these same institutions can then orchestrate value between the different parties on the platform, stepping back from intermediating and becoming a system of collective intelligence.

Don’t waste a crisis

Articulate the change narrative

Use stop/go triggers

In summary

The new moat in financial services (and why P. Thiel, not W. Buffett,…

The new moat in financial services

The new moat in financial services (and why Peter Thiel, not Warren Buffett, is the new investment wizard)

by Ben Robinson | July 26, 2019 | 11 minutes read

In the networked age, scale of production is no longer a moat. Instead, network effects are the new moat. Peter Thiel gets this; Buffet doesn’t.

I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable ‘moats’ –Warren Buffett

The quote above from Warren Buffet, a statement he first made in a 1996 investor letter, is one of his most famous. It neatly encapsulates his investment approach: invest in giant companies that can achieve a “moat” by operating at a scale that others can’t reach.

By spreading the fixed costs of expensive, non-transferable assets like machinery or a banking licence, as well as highly-geared operating expenses like brand marketing and regulatory compliance, over a larger revenue base than competitors, these companies could be better known and cheaper. And, if you look at Buffet’s portfolio, it’s full of companies operating in industries with high fixed costs and high operational gearing: capital goods companies like BYD, consumer goods like Coca Cola and, above all, financial services companies like Wells Fargo, Amex and Bank of America.

The investment approach was massively successful — until it wasn’t. In the period 1979 to 2008, Warren Buffet outperformed the S&P 500 by 12.6% a year on average, cementing his reputation as the Wizard of Omaha, the most successful investor of all time. But — a less known fact — since the financial crisis, Warren Buffett has underperformed the S&P. One might be tempted to attribute this relative under-performance to the heavy financial services weighting in the Berkshire Hathaway portfolio. However, while a factor, deeper structural changes are at play.

Problem number one with the Buffett investment philosophy is that, in the digital age, critical mass is within most companies’ reach. Critical mass — or minimum efficient level of scale — is the scale of production a company needs to reach where it won’t have a major unit cost disadvantage compared to its competitors. After this point, diminishing returns to scale kick in, which means that even if a competitor has greater volume it won’t translate into the same order of magnitude differential in unit costs.

However, as we’ve written before, companies can now plug into the scale economies of third-parties like AWS, which spread fixed costs over the volumes of all customers, to get to scale faster. In banking, you see the emergence of banking-as-a-servce providers, like Railsbank or SolarisBank, levelling the field for new entrants. All in all, this means that scale does not represent the barrier to entry it used to.

Scale can become a hindrance

The second problem with Buffet’s investment philosophy is that diseconomies of scale, or negative returns to scale, manifest themselves more frequently and earlier.

In the industrial age, the trick to achieving an unbreachable moat was to produce standardized goods at mass scale and then invest in marketing to create sufficient demand to sell all of these goods. The challenge now is two-fold. Firstly, the broadcast channels that companies used to advertise are being eroded at the same time as there are many more demands on the consumer’s attention, making it harder to engage in the same type of mass-marketing.

The second issue is that, since consumers are now online, we can know much more about them, as well as have a direct relationship with them. This means that at the same time as it’s become possible to operate profitably at smaller scales of production, it’s become possible to produce goods which cater to smaller customer demographics, and to reach these customers directly — which explains the rise of artisanal goods and direct-to-consumer brands.

But, for digital goods, it goes further, artificial intelligence increasingly allows platforms to match services to customers as well as personalize services to each customer.

To put it another way, in the digital age, the mass consumer is dead.

The new moat

This begs the question, is it still possible to create a moat in the digital age? One answer could be that the idea of a moat is obsolete, a relic of the industrial age, sort of what Elon Musk said when he challenged Warren Buffett recently. But, the reality is a new moat is possible and it’s the diametric opposite of what came before.

Scale isn’t the barrier to keep out new entrants, scale is what attracts new entrants to work with you. Scale doesn’t allow you to push a mass produced product to the mass consumer, scale is what enables you to tailor an individualized product to every consumer.

“I think moats are lame. If your only defense against invading armies is a moat, you will not last long” – Elon Musk

This definition of scale is one that accepts and capitalizes on the new realities of the digital age. Maximizing production scale by itself is less of a competitive advantage and, increasingly, a competitive disadvantage. But the fact that consumers and business are connected means that a new competitive advantage can be achieved by maximizing network size.

Where a network has strong social engagement, like Facebook, adding more users increases the value of the network for everyone. Where a network matches buyers and sellers, like Amazon, increasing the network size increases choice and, by extension, value. Where a platform analyzes data to serve up the best results, like Google, the more data that comes from adding users, the better the results become. And most platforms are a combination of these social, two-sided and data network effects.

What is more, the new moat is a superior moat. Supply-side economies of scale, while a formidable barrier to entry in the industrial age, always suffered from diminishing returns.

Demand-side economies of scale, however, are subject to increasing returns to scale since more users create more value for other users in a self-reinforcing positive cycle. This is why in markets where network effects are strongest, there are winner-takes-all dynamics.

Does this mean that supply-side economies of scale are irrelevant? Not at all, as we wrote a few years ago, these platforms based on demand-side economies of scale (network effects) often become asset heavy as a way to reinforce the strength of these network effects and maximize profitability. But the difference is that maximizing scale economies was not the goal in itself. Instead, these companies found a route to mass adoption and, from there, put in place the assets to sustain the network. In other words, a business grows its assets top down like the roots of a tree.

If the new moat is to achieve network effects, how can these be achieved in banking? In our mind, this is probably asking the wrong question. Banking is inherently a transaction-based activity. This makes it unsuitable to most types of network effects.

For example, most companies that have tried to build social network effects into banking, either as part or whole of their USP, have failed. We don’t want to chat with our friends specifically about money, we don’t want to share all of the information on our assets and liabilities. Which means that, although the new banks sprouting up might be cheaper and more convenient than what came before, they aren’t able to arrive at meaningfully and sustainably lower costs of customer acquisition numbers once they’ve gone beyond the early adopter audience.

It is possible to create marketplaces for financial services, but because banking is transaction-based (and fundamentally not a social activity), the surface area around which to create a marketplace is limited. Basically, we don’t spend much time on banking apps, which makes it difficult to introduce us to other products and services, which we then don’t purchase frequently anyway.

This podcast was recorded at FinTECHTalents’19 Festival: we’re exploring the potential of unleashing network effects in financial services. Ben Robinson is joined into the conversation by: Evgenia Plotnikova (Partner @ Dawn Capital); Martin McCann (CEO at Trade Ledger); Oliver Prill (CEO at Tide Business Banking).

Some banks and fintech providers get round this by targeting specific demographics and then giving them the tools they need to run their business/life, such as Tide, which understands that freelancers and small businesses will send invoices and submit expenses more frequently than they’ll apply for a loan. But, these business are niche.

When this is attempted on a bigger scale, it comes back to the same problem of unit economies: high CAC in the absence of social network effects and low lifetime value in the absence of the engagement.

The mistake we think many people make when they think about banking and network effects is to apply the following logic: banking is a massive market, therefore we must target it and find a way to generate network effects. We believe it is smarter to turn the logic on its head and think about how to put banking into channels and services that have high engagement and strong network effects, what Anthemis calls “Embedded Finance”.

As Amazon is showing, the goal isn’t picking off a few high value revenue lines, but making value flow ever more easily within the Amazon ecosystem, removing friction and making it easier for buyers and sellers to trade. Similarly, the Alibaba and WeChat models both serve a higher purpose: to embed financial services into people’s lifestyles.

The direction of travel can go in the other direction too: that is, starting with banking and seeking to embed it in other services with higher engagement. This is what Moneo is trying to do and what TinkOff Bank in Russia has done so successfully. Through partnerships as well as launching its own products, Tinkoff has created a super app akin to WeChat in China where consumer can do everything from booking theatre tickets to giving their kids chores.

But, in general, it seems more probable that banking will get embedded into other services than vice versa for the reasons already stated: it’s a high CAC and low engagement starting point from which to build out an ecosystem or Super App.

That doesn’t mean that there won’t be plenty of opportunities to build big businesses in banking, that enjoy strong network effects. But, to our mind, these are unlikely to be directly client-facing.

Earlier this year, we wrote a piece about systems of intelligence in finance. The piece looked at these systems mostly from a supply-side and architectural standpoint, arguing that solution architecture needed to change in response to the split of distribution and manufacturing and to capitalize on open banking. It concluded that systems of intelligence would emerge as the most valuable parts of the Enterprise IT value chain.

Here we make the same argument, but from more of a market standpoint. If we accept that banking will become increasingly embedded in third-party services and channels, it doesn’t necessarily follow that, as many people argue, banking will become completely commoditized.

As markets digitize, two types of intermediaries tend to emerge: those that seek to internalize network effects by commoditizing supply, aggregators like Amazon or Facebook, and platforms that externalize network effects by empowering suppliers, like the Apple AppStore or Shopify (Ben Thompson sets out this distinction very well in this much recommended post).

In financial services, then, the same pattern will play out: aggregators like Amazon will commoditize financial services suppliers, while platforms will emerge to intermediate between suppliers and distributors in a non-zero-sum, value accretive way. These platforms will be systems of intelligence.

Systems of intelligence are evolving. Today, most systems of intelligence are deployed for individual clients and with the end of digitizing services. But this is just the first step. Digitizing services makes them consumable through non-proprietary bank channels, but it also generates a new stream of data that can be used to make the services better fit consumer needs. So the next step will be that systems of intelligence will then use that data to help providers more intelligently price and package financial services.

But once that has been achieved, the opportunity will exist to then serve up the right service to the consumer at the moment of need, which mean systems of intelligence become systems of network intelligence, matching the needs of consumers with the inventory of suppliers in the smartest way.

This is the evolution we observe happening at companies like additiv, Assure Hedge and Trade Ledger. Trade Ledger is digitizing the origination of credit services so that lenders can supply credit at the right price and with the speed needed by fast-growing SMEs. But beyond that, it is able to use data to give lenders a real-time picture of asset quality, even for intangibles assets, allowing lenders to offer new types of services better matched to changing customer needs. But, ultimately, the opportunity exists to then link lenders with the different players in the ecosystem, helping embed banking into whatever is the right channel to serve the customer at the point of need. Martin McCann, Trade Ledger CEO, puts it well in this excellent blog:

“Within business finance, the opportunity exists not just to connect banks with their customers, but banks with banks, corporates with corporates, corporates with complementary third-party services providers and so on.”

If Warren Buffett has missed the shift from supply- to demand-side economies of scale, there is one investor who most certainly hasn’t. That is Peter Thiel. His investment in Facebook, a business underpinned by massive network effects, made him a billionaire. Conversely, Buffett passed on Facebook, like Google and Amazon, because he couldn’t get comfortable with the valuation, saying “I didn’t understand the power of the model as I went along.”

And the performance of the two investors also couldn’t be more divergent. Whereas Buffett has underperformed the S&P since 2009, Thiel’s Founders Fund has more than two-fold outperformed the VC fund industry since 2011 (the only figures we could find in the public domain). Since 2011, the Founders Fund is up by $4.6 for every $1 invested.

And where is Peter Thiel investing now? If you look at his holdings, there are many B2C companies there for sure. But, more than anything, there are systems of intelligence — across many industries, but especially in financial services. This leaves Peter Thiel well-placed to capitalize on what Matthew Harris, another venture capitalist, sees as the fourth major wave of digitization after internet, cloud and mobile; one that, in his view, will create more value— $3.6 trillion — that its three predecessors combined.

So, you don’t need to believe us that systems of intelligence are the next big thing. Just look to Peter Thiel, the new investment wizard.


Do Traditional Banks Really Still Own the Customer Relationship?

Do Traditional Banks Still Hold Customer Relationship

Do Traditional Banks Really Still Own the Customer Relationship?

by Emma Wadey | Dec 11 2019 | 8 minutes read

Conversations and sessions at FinTECHTalents last month covered many hot topics, but one theme dominated: the customer relationship is at stake.

Banks continue to draw a false comfort from retaining customer current/checking accounts, without realizing that data, engagement and monetization opportunities are seeping away to other players.

Despite many banks having already embarked on digital transformation projects and despite many having launched an array of fintech/tech partnerships and initiatives, more is needed for them to prosper in the digital era. During FinTECHTalents, Jim Marous put it frankly:

“Banks have willful blindness; they don’t realise that they are losing business. Just because bank customers don’t switch doesn’t mean that they love you.”

Jim Marous, Digital Banking Report CEO, The Financial Brand Co-Publisher and Forbes Contributor speaking to Ben Robinson of Aperture.co

This ‘blindness’ comes from studying attrition rates which don’t show the bigger picture. Jim explains how this gives false comfort by talking about his own banking arrangements: “With my business bank, I still give deposits and get withdrawals, but most transactions are handled by PayPal, they understand my business intimately. PayPal can offer me a pre-approved business loan instantly. If I went to my bank, it would probably take me 4 maybe 5 days to get approval and that’s assuming that they will approve it at all. I can get this immediately from PayPal. My bank may have my business, but they don’t have my relationship.”

This view was further reinforced during the keynote session on Day 1 of the event when Aritra Chakravarty, Founder and CEO of Project Imagine and Dozens highlighted that:

”The number of customer accounts a bank has doesn’t reflect customer behaviour. People change partners more regularly than their bank; just because you have a large customer base it doesn’t mean that they are engaged and profitable.”

In short, then, for the incumbent banks, headline customer might hide the extent to which their business are being disrupted by new competition. So, what is needed for banks to truly engage with the millions of headline customers?

“We spend 3 hours a day on our mobile phone. On average we look at our phones around 80 times. We scroll through 300 feet of news-feed every day, that’s the equivalent height of Big Ben!” said Russell Pert, Industry lead, Financial Services at Facebook on Day 1 of the conference before concluding:

“people want to do their banking through the services where they live their lives.”

The point being made here is a profound one. It is easier to embed financial services into a service where customers already have a lot of engagement than trying to create engagement in a banking channel. Think how many times you visit, say, WhatsApp (another Facebook property) compared to your banking app.

Also, where banks are using artificial intelligence (AI) to understand customers better, they’re often introducing more, not less friction into the customer relationship. As innovation and entrepreneurship professional at RBS, Roshan Rohatgi said in the Behavioural Science panel,

”Stopping a card transaction due to a possible fraud risk may protect the customer, but can lead to embarrassment and negativity with the bank.”

Bradley Leimer and Theodora Lau, Co-Founders of Unconventional Ventures speaking to Ben Robinson of Aperture.co

And it has never been easier to embed banking into other services. Open Banking opens up access to customer transactional data, creating a unique opportunity for third-parties not only to serve embed banking into their services, but also to do it more personally by meshing up contextual and locational data with bank data. As Bradley Leimer put it to us,

“The promise of open banking to a High Street bank is a degradation of their relationship with the customer. For a fintech, it’s an inroad into a relationship. For a tech provider, it’s a way to take more data in, understand and profile a customer better, and further entrench them into the ecosystem.”

So should banks despair? Not all, sometimes the answer is to go back to basics, rather than to try to emulate Facebook or WeChat.

Roger Vincent, Chief Innovation Officer at Trade Ledger pointed out there is a global funding gap of £1.2 trillion, defined as the shortfall between the capital SMEs require to grow their businesses and what they receive in lending, and that gap continues to grow.

Roger Vincent, Chief Innovation Officer at Trade Ledger

The problem, says Roger, is that

“the economy is becoming increasingly intangible, but banks aren’t yet comfortable lending against these intangible assets, which requires them to capture and process new datasets in real time.”

But taking advantage of new datasets to get credit flowing to SMEs is exactly the kind of opportunity banks should be seizing with digitization.

Likewise, helping to create financial services that are better moulded around people’s changing lifestyles is another major opportunity. As Dharmesh Mistry put it, the way to create a deeper relationship with customers is give them “everything they need for a given context”.

He used the example of a freelancer: banks should adapt their own services, for example, by giving access to credit to top up volatile incomes, but in addition they should provide all of the ancillary services that a freelancer might need such as filing taxes, raising invoices, submitting expenses and so on.

James Perry of BUD at FinTECHTalents
James Perry, Head of Client Delivery at Bud speaking to Ben Robinson of Aperture.co

This might entail a move to more of ecosystem-based business model, but platforms are emerging to facilitate these models. Trade Ledger is building a platform that could easily facilitate this, while Bud is doing this now. As James Perry, Head of Client Delivery at Bud, says:

“We open the platform where banks don’t have to do procurement for 8 to 10 providers, you only have to do it with Bud. We open the door to a network and allow lots of different providers to come “

But going back to basics even further, the route to more meaningful customer interaction may lie simply in helping customers to make better decisions.

Banks sit on rich datasets, but when they’re used well (if at all), it tends to be in the pursuit of up-selling and cross-selling. In part the issue is that customers might get the wrong products for their needs and also that they might find it intrusive — as Poojya Manjunath from Lloyds Banking Group said within the Behavioural Science panel,

“when a personalised message forces the client into a transaction/money exchange that’s when the customer will often back off.”

But the issue is bigger, the products might end up reinforcing bad behaviours.

Like the Facebook algorithm that serves us up more of the content we like, serving up more loans to an over-spender can perpetuate their problems and amplify the cognitive biases from which we all suffer. Instead, banks should help customers to understand themselves better and help them to achieve their long term goals.

Dr. Peter Brooks, Chief Behavioural Scientist at Barclays, put it well on the Behavioural Science panel,

“If our customers aren’t managing their money well, it is our job is to help them to manage it better. The result is that they will become better customers and their lives will improve and they will become stronger economically which helps both banks and society as a whole.”

And he went on to say that the problem often sets in with the product design, “the typical focus of a product manager is about delivering the end product and launching, rather than how to design it in the first instance. You need to get the design right first. Look at the customer journey, look at how the customer uses the product and ask if it encouraging positive behaviours.”

Pol Navarro, Digital Director at TSB with Ben Robinson of Aperture.co

In terms of using data to put the customers’ needs first, Pol Navarro, Digital Director at TSB, used a good example from the SME space.

“There are lots of opportunities to anticipate things. Imagine with Open Banking where you can easily get data from all your accounts wherever they are, and combine that with your accounting software in the cloud, banks can easily help customers predict their cashflow, for example, saying that in two weeks there are all these payments coming but you do not have sufficient funds and therefore something must be done whether it be taking out a loan or bringing money in from another account to avoid an impact in your cashflow.”

The imperative to make this shift to helping customer make better financial and commercial decisions was underlined starkly by Bradley Leimer, who sees it as the existential challenge:

“Banking is an industry today that continues to take profit rather than give profits. It’s a value proposition that’s about how much value I can derive from you rather than how much money I could derive for you. That to me is the biggest opportunity — along with a long term view — that the industry needs to shift or it will completely give up and recede the relationship entirely to big tech and a series of platforms that banking itself will no longer be a part of.”


Any bank looking at headline customers numbers and giving itself a pat on the back should be wary that disruption continues to abound. There remains the big threat, heightened since the advent of Open Banking, that the large technology platforms will eat their lunch.

But the challenge seems to be at one more profound and simpler. Banks more than anything need to change philosophy by promoting customer need above their own. Practically, this means using data to help customers understand themselves better and, in turn, helping introduce them to the services they’ll need and the banking services to support it. Trying to be Facebook won’t work, just try to be better banks.

To see the full interview with James Perry from Bud click here.

Digital Era Banking Systems

Digital Era Banking Systems of Intelligence

Digital Era Banking Systems

by Ben Robinson | Dec 17, 2019 | 11 minutes read

The banking software market is reconfiguring around the demands of the digital economy — and value is accruing to new systems of intelligence

In Clayton Christensen’s Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits, he talks about the “reciprocal processes of commoditization and de-commoditization” that occur in technology value chains when product architectures change:

“The law states that when modularity and commoditization cause attractive profits to disappear at one stage in the value chain, the opportunity to earn attractive profits will usually emerge at an adjacent stage.”

Our view is that this same process of commoditization and de-commoditization is playing out in the market for banking software. Changes in technology (cloud and AI) as well as changes in regulation (real-time payments and open banking) are causing a formerly integrated system to become modularized and new players are emerging to exploit this shift— new core banking systems but also new systems of intelligence that, akin to operating systems, orchestrate value across their networks.

A brief history of banking software systems

When we look at the technology debt in the banking industry, we might forget that banks were once IT pioneers. Banks were among the first industries to use software, adopting branch accounting systems to keep records of customer bank balances as well as to calculate interest, fees and tax.

But, because banks were such early adopters, they wrote their own applications — there was no software industry at that time from which to buy applications. This might not have been a problem except that 1/banks didn’t stop writing applications when commercial software arrived and 2/they have kept and extended those same branch accounting systems ever since — producing the kind of unwieldy system architecture depicted below.

A typical universal bank system architecture (source BCG)
A typical universal bank system architecture (source BCG)

Smaller and newer banks (from the 1980s onwards) skipped the branch accounting system and instead moved to packaged software, integrated core banking systems. These systems had many advantages: they could run on much cheaper hardware (and software) than S/360 mainframes; they could keep separate records based on parties and products (so that it was possible to have the same customer across branches and products and to provide consolidated views of customer holdings); and, they were integrated front-to-back — from the teller to the general ledger — meaning that changes could be applied across the whole system, reducing significantly both the run-the-bank and change-the-bank costs. And so banks running integrated core banking systems were in a position to achieve scale economies as well as to cross-sell effectively and, when product builders were added, to launch new products to market quickly.

System S/360

Bank systems in the internet era

With the arrival of the internet, banks opened up proprietary channels (apps and internet portals) which allowed customers to query their own bank records and set up payment instructions. But that was the extent of the upgrade: neither branch-based accounting systems nor integrated core banking systems were significantly re-architected in response to internet banking. In fairness, some core banking systems were already real-time and most have been scalable enough to cope with the rise in customer interactions. But the situation is changing.

Integrated to Internet Banking

The open banking era

In most industries, product manufacturers have a choice about whether or not they sell through distributors. In banking, in Europe and an expanding number of other places, this agency is being lost. Open Banking legislation is forcing banks to put their inventory online by obliging them to share customer transactional data with third parties (where customers give consent). In effect, banks face a stark choice: become aggregators of own-labelled and third-party products or risk being disintermediated by other aggregators, whether from inside the industry or outside (e.g Amazon or Alibaba).

The Open Banking era
CB Insights showing the spread of Open Banking legislation across the globe

In addition to open banking regulations, most jurisdictions have enacted — or are enacting — legislation related to real-time payments. This will likely have a profound impact on value chains outside of just banking — for payment schemes, for instance — but in banking it will usher in an era of not just higher volumes, but lower fees per transaction, requiring a step change in scalability if banks are to be able to keep up — and to do so profitably.

In response to these two changes, the integrated nature of most banking systems is unsustainable. If banks are to distribute third-party as well as own-labelled products, they will need a separate system for distribution. If banks are to cope with the demands of ever-increasing payment volume as well as continually rising interactions, they will need to separate channels from manufacturing to boost straight-through processing (STP). To put this last point in context, if a bank moves from 99% STP to 99.9% STP, this would likely translate not to a 1% reduction in costs but more likely a 10x reduction in costs.

The future model for banking systems could be the retail industry where the major players have all created distribution systems independently of accounting systems. But there is precedent that is much closer to home: when regulators pushed for higher STP in capital markets in the early 2000s, the industry very quickly split between front office (the buy side) and middle office (the sell side) and systems were re-architected accordingly. And, whereas in capital markets there was a push for faster transactions, in banking there is both a push for faster transactions and a push to open up the industry to new competitors. As such, this split seems all but certain.

Systems of intelligence

At the moment, there is a tendency to try to put more and more logic into banking channels, but this is flawed. Proprietary banking channels are likely to disappear as banking becomes more “embedded” in other products and services (such as WeChat), making these investments increasingly pointless.

Instead, this logic needs to sit somewhere else, where it can be used to produce a high level of engagement across multiple channels, where it can be combined with data from multiple other parties and systems, and where it can handle inquiries independently of orders and order entry asynchronously from order execution. This somewhere else is a system of intelligence.

Systems of Intelligence Basic.png

We borrow the term “system of intelligence” from this seminal article from Jerry Chen, a Partner at Greylock. In his article, Jerry describes how application software is splitting into three layers: systems of engagement, systems of intelligence and systems of record. If we apply the same taxonomy here, customer channels are the system of engagement (although we prefer to use the term system of interaction because we see these as thin clients, integrated using REST principles); core banking systems are the principal system of record; and distribution systems are the systems of intelligence.

In Jerry’s article, he highlights the importance of technology changes in creating the opening for new systems of intelligence. One is cloud in that it adds a new level of scalability on which to build these systems, but the more important is AI, which fundamentally changes the amount of data we can process and the insights we can draw from it. Echoing Clayton Christensen, Jerry Chen says that, because of AI, 

Systems of intelligence in banking

In Jerry Chen’s article, he makes the point that providers of systems of record often have an advantage in creating systems of intelligence because they have privileged access to their own data. This is true for banking also, although open banking removes part of this advantage (for transactional information). A bigger advantage for incumbent banking software comes by dint of serving hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of banks; creating the pull to attract other data sources to mash up with data from their own system of record.

The playbook for incumbents, regardless of industry, remains Salesforce. A lot of people get excited about the Salesforce AppExchange, a marketplace for complementary applications, since it created a platform business model with two-sided network effects. But at least as important in amassing the data to become a system of intelligence are Force.com (now the Lightning Platform), its platform-as-a-service on which third-parties build native applications, and Mulesoft, its API integration platform, which allows third-parties to integrate their existing applications and datasets. Lightning and MuleSoft don’t just provide a route to data but lock-in and switching costs around that data. And then, working on this data and giving an additional incentive to share the data is Einstein, the Salesforce system for artificial intelligence, deriving insights for Salesforce and its customers. We would argue that it is ensemble — MuleSoft, Lightning, AppExchange and Einstein — that makes up the system of intelligence.

Salesforce’s system of intelligence

And so in banking it is unlikely that creating an AppExchange equivalent will be sufficient to create a system of intelligence.

It is likely to need all of the above components: an API platform, PaaS, AI and an app store. And let’s not forget that because of open banking, the distribution play for a banking system of intelligence goes further than distributing apps — to helping banks distribute third-party banking services.

This extends the list of necessary capabilities to include, for example, order management and an extensible product catalogue, as well as customer engagement tools that, among other things, would help identify the right content and services to offer up to customers at the right time and over the right channel.

In addition, we believe a key component of successful systems of intelligence will be to share intelligence across their ecosystems.

The idea, very well articulated in this blog by Peter Zhegin, is that the source of competitive advantage (the moat) is constantly shifting. Processes— and software — are declining in importance relative to data. And within data, Peter argues that the moat is moving away from data collection — amassing the largest possible data set with which to train a model that benefits the company’s product — to improving the collective intelligence of the network.

In banking software, therefore, advantage is moving from having the best application to having the most value-added ecosystem around that application (app store) to helping customers make smarter decisions (system of intelligence) to helping the whole ecosystem perform better (a system of network intelligence).

As a practical example, this could mean moving from providing independent banks with the best credit scoring model to facilitating an open banking network.

Commoditization and de-commoditization — the emerging vendor landscape

As in any market where the value chain is being broken up, there is likely to be a significant shake-up in the competitive landscape for banking software. The keenest fight will be to dominate the market for systems of intelligence, since this is where value will accumulate. But we are also seeing new entrants into the core banking market.

Since the system of intelligence aggregates logic away from the system of record, the system of record is required to do less. Effectively, the most important characteristics of the system of record will increasingly become speed and cost.

As a result, these systems will be re-architected for speed (into microservices) and they will be deployed in the public cloud. And it is no surprise, therefore, that we are seeing the arrival of new cloud-native core banking systems such as Mambu, one of the first and the most successful so far.

Furthermore, as the need for scalability increases, we predict that we may even see these systems further fragment, with the accounting capabilities (fees, limits, etc) splitting from the manufacturing capabilities, which, incidentally, seems to be how Thought Machine is architected.

Digital Banking to Real-time Banking

As regards the systems of intelligence, we foresee a three-player race.

The first players are horizontal systems of intelligence. Insofar as the system of intelligence is like an operating system (nCino actually calls itself “a revolutionary bank operating system”) — providing a consistent set of interfaces, mashing up and running analytics on multiple data sets — these systems do not need to be as domain-specific as systems of record.

Accordingly, there is the potential for horizontal players to make bigger inroads into banking software — such as Salesforce, which already has good traction in wealth management and is pushing aggressively into retail banking.

The second players are the incumbent providers of systems of record. Many are well-positioned — having the pull of large customer bases and investing in the tech infrastructure. Finastra, for instance, has assembled many of the underlying components of a system of intelligence — an app store (Fusion Store), a PaaS (Fusion Operate) and an API platform (Fusion Create). The bigger question is likely to be whether management at these companies will place enough importance on a platform strategy to be able to overcome the immune system challenges.

The third set of players are the new entrants. With a couple of exceptions, such as nCino, these are chiefly vertically focused: for example, Additiv is focused on wealth management (and increasingly credit), The Glue is focused on retail banking, and Trade Ledger on lending. While there are likely many more shared than vertically-specific components in banking systems of intelligence, which makes a cross-banking strategy possible, an initial vertical focus makes sense to build a network quicker (the micromarket strategy to overcoming the chicken-and-egg challenge) and conforms with the pattern of disruptive innovations, which are typically commercialized first in smaller and emerging segments.

To sum up…

In response to regulatory and technology changes, the banking market is undergoing a digital upgrade with new networked business models emerging.

The most successful banking technology companies will be those that align themselves with — and enable — this change.

Our bet is on those that can create the best systems of intelligence.

What is a Challenger Bank for?

What is a Challenger Bank for?
The battle is on to see which firms will dominate the internet-era banking market

What is a Challenger Bank for?

by Ben Robinson | Sep 18 2019 | 13 minutes read

The last couple of months have seen JP Morgan close its digital bank Finn, as well as BPCE close the UK arm of its digital bank, Fidor. This has led to a lot of speculation about whether it’s possible to run a disruptive business within an incumbent organisation. But, it also raises a simpler point. When does it make sense to launch a challenger bank?

Challenger banks are definitely in vogue. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators sought to introduce more competition into their domestic banking markets. One of the most progressive was the UK regulator, which lowered capital requirements for start-up banks as well shortened the application process, leading to a influx of new competitors. But many jurisdictions, including the UK, also introduce Open Banking legislation, which obliges banks to share customer data with third-party providers, also increasing competition.

The Open Banking era
This graphic from CB Insights shows the spread of Open Banking legislation across the globe

In addition to the regulators’ efforts, technology has also lowered barriers to entry. Infrastructure services like AWS have reduced start-up costs while smartphones have opened up distribution at the same time as making possible new digital features, such as remote, paperless customer onboarding.

The result has been an explosion in the number of new companies offering banking services — 17% of all companies having been created since 2005, according to Accenture.

Accenture Beyond North Star Gazing Open Banking
Source: Accenture, Beyond North Star Gazing
Challenger Banks a Global Phenomenon

But digital banks are not just banks without branches. They are offering something different. Part of this is about customer experience — they have built their offerings from scratch, taking advantage of new technology to mould their services around people’s lives. But part is also around business model.

A look at the latest Monzo annual report illustrates this well. It has over 2m customers, but it makes significant losses. It has over 2m customers, but makes net operating income of only £9.2m (£5.7/customer). The majority of its money comes from fee income, not interest income. And, despite heavy losses, it is ramping up marketing expenses (up 700%) and pushing forward with international expansion.

Note: Monzo reported 2m customers as of May 2019. However, most of the metrics above are calculated based on the total number of customers (1.6m) at the end of fiscal year, Feb 2019

In this regard, Monzo — like the other challenger banks — is operating a classic digital-era business model. In contrast to traditional banking models, it recognizes that distribution is not the primary point of differentiation in the value chain; but, instead, customers are.

Number of Customers per Challenger Bank

It is this desire to maximize customer numbers that explains why, despite a historical customer acquisition cost of less than £3, Monzo is engaging in TV ad campaigns. This explains why its investors are prepared to cover its losses and fund its international expansion. And lastly it explains why most income comes through fees, not interest income. Because this is a business where, with low customer acquisition costs, low churn (NPS is +80%) and low cost to serve (GBP30 per account at present and falling fast as scale economies kick in), the incentive is to maximize lifetime value.

Valuation per customer Challenger Banks

Monzo, like other challengers, will seek some direct customer monetization for sure — Monzo is now offering loans — but this is likely to be levied on those who can most afford it, in the shape of premium subscriptions, ensuring that most services remain free (current account, foreign ATM fees) to attract as many new customers as possible. Instead, most of its monetization will be indirect, using the pull of its large customer base to bring in third-party fees. At present, most of its fee income comes from interchange fees as its customers spend money using their Monzo debit card, but over time other routes will make more meaningful contributions. Monzo has said that it wishes to become its customers’ “financial control centre” by introducing them to the best possible third-party financial services and, although the resulting commissions from these introductions are small at present (just £85k), this will grow as two-sided network effects materialize.

Monzo customer contribution margin

For incumbent financial institutions, it is difficult to match the challenger bank model. Their businesses were created for a different age, where distribution was the choke point in the value chain. The need for a costly and difficult-to-achieve banking licence plus a network of physical branches kept out new entrants, meaning banks could push undifferentiated, expensive products to captive clients. And now it is extremely difficult for banks to change course and match challenger banks like-for-like — they don’t have the cost base, the financial incentives or innovation capabilities to do so. And so many banks are starting to launch challenger banks themselves.

Incumbent Banks Offering
The now defunct universal business model where banks were able to mass produce undifferentiated products

However, the bank-within-a-bank model is also difficult to pull off.

Firstly, as Aperture-subscriber John Hagel so eloquently describes in this piece, you have the problem of the immune system fighting off anything that threatens the business model and revenue streams of the body corporate (what in more successful companies might be described as the Innovator’s Dilemma). This likely contributed to closure of Fidor UK and explains why the rest of the business is up for sale. But the challenge to incumbents is very real. As the following table from Citi shows, banks’ RoE is much more sensitive to falls in revenue than reduction in costs, meaning that with stubbornly high costs — and in the absence of business model change (see below) — it will be difficult for banks to countenance a strategy that cannibalizes existing revenue streams.

Source: Citi GPS Research

Assuming that the immune system can be countered — by creating a completely separate organization, with different people, processes, tech, brand, incentives and reporting directly into the CEO — then you have the problem that innovation is hard. This seems to have been more of the root issue at Finn. Built on the bank’s existing IT infrastructure, its objective was more around putting a new UX on traditional products than using the virtues of digital to create a unique offering. As a result, it didn’t manage to attract large numbers, let alone introduce viral features that leverage the power of networked consumers, as Revolut has successfully done.

Revolut

The last problem is one of strategic intent. If a bank launches a digital bank because its strategy is a) to defend itself against challenger banks; b) to lower cost to serve by using digital channels; c) to improve User Experience; d) to capitalize on Blockchain/AI/IoT/Cloud or e) to change its perception among younger customers, it’s probably going to fail.

Launching a digital bank is about launching a digital era business model, which goes way beyond changing brand perception, user experience or moving customers onto cheaper-to-serve channels. As noted above, it is about maximizing customer numbers and engagement to activate demand side economies of scale. This requires clear strategic intent because, in turn, it requires organizational transformation. Launching a challenger bank can be a (faster and less disruptive) route to digitization, but it is neither an easy option nor a panacea.

Our view is that a challenger bank strategy has a higher likelihood of success if is underpinned by one (or more) of the following six objectives.

It is interesting to see Goldman Sachs’ digital bank Marcus referenced in so many of the articles on Finn. For us, it is very different. For instance, it is built on a new technology stack. But most importantly, it moves Goldman into a completely new space, consumer finance, where it does not have the cannibalization concerns that trigger the corporate immune system. This allows it to operate under very different constraints and, like other new entrants, challenge the status quo with a proposition that includes market-beating interest rates, no origination or late fees as well as customizable payment dates and payments. And it’s working: Marcus had 4 million customers and $46bn in deposits at the end of March 2019, two and half years after launch.

In the same way as entering new markets allows the new business to operate more freely, so does entering new countries. It is also a less risky strategy than M&A, which made sense at a time when distribution was the barrier to entry, but now encumbers the acquirer with all of the legacy issues they inherit. And this is why the challenger-led strategy is being pursued by many banks, including DBS, which has launched digibank (“a bank in a smartphone”) in India and Indonesia with already over 3m customers — and why it is looking to do the same in Vietnam.

Launching a challenger bank with the purpose of bringing banking to the unbanked is by definition the antithesis of cannibalization — because no one was providing these services in the first place. And, as banks like CBA in Kenya have shown with M-Shwari and now Stawi, when you combine mobile distribution with low costs and intuitive user experience, you can succeed in bringing financial services to millions of people. But, as demonstrated below, while countries like Kenya and China have very successfully leveraged digitization to tackle financial inclusion, there still exists massive scope to do the same in populous counties like Egypt, Indonesia or Pakistan.

The Financial Inclusion Opportunity

Another reason for launching Marcus was that Goldman Sachs can use retail deposits to lower its group cost of capital. But a business where this is more transparently the objective is EQ Bank in Canada. It is a subsidiary of Equitable Bank, which provides residential and commercial real estate lending services, and the bank uses EQ customers’ savings to fund its lending, allowing it to start to increase its net interest margin (now at 1.6%) in a low interest environment. Structuring the group like this not only creates complementarity between the bank and its challenger brand, as opposed to a cannibalization threat, but also reinforces incumbency advantages. EQ Bank can sustain its above-market deposit rates thanks to its parent’s large lending book.

Equitable EQ Bank Funding Mix

Another reason to launch a challenger bank is to attempt lower-risk and faster-to-value technology renovation. Banks sit on decades of technology debt, batch-based legacy systems built around products not people that have been continually added to over time, resulting in massive cost and massive complexity. If banks are to compete on price and on user experience with digitally-native challenger banks, then they will have to address this technology debt. But doing so is expensive and risky, which why it is tempting for many banks to start again — create a new bank with new technology.

A typical universal bank system architecture (source BCG)
This BCG image shows the mass of interdependent systems and interfaces within a typical universal bank

This “build and migrate” strategy is still somewhat unproven , even though it looks like some banks like Santander, with Openbank, may be going down this route (its annual report states that Openbank is “the testing ground for our future technology platform”).

For banks considering this strategy, they should be mindful that they will have to run two IT platforms in parallel for a good while (it is unlikely that regulators would let incumbents close all branches — or indeed the bank itself — for a long time). They should also be aware that there will be customer attrition in the base business as they divert investment into the new bank and also likely attrition when they try to move across customers to the new bank. In addition, they should start small, that is, with a single product offering like savings, which will enable them to test the market proposition before committing big expenditure, get fast RoI on the initial capital expenditure and minimize the risk of rejection from the corporate immune system — at the same time as probably lowering cost of funding (or, in the case of one challenger bank we consulted, whose first product will be to lend boomer savings to millennials, increase asset yield). Furthermore, if the technological renovation is successful and the bank creates a great platform, then, as Starling, OakNorth and Ant Financial have done, it can sell this to other banks — the “make yourself the first customer” model of creating an exponential software business.

Oak North, a unicorn SME challenger bank, sells its lending analytics platform to other banks

The counterargument to the “build and migrate” strategy is two-fold. Firstly, modern core banking systems are modular, meaning that progressive renovation is possible — replacing systems one by one — to combat risk and speed up time to value. In our experience, however, these projects tend to more complex than they seem and subject to the same issues as all in situ transformations, such a scope creep. A better argument for not executing a build and migrate strategy is that it is increasingly possible to achieve what banks want — improve customer user experience, launch digitally-native products, run advanced analytics and open up to third-parties — without replacing all of their back-office systems, as vendors like Additiv and The Glue are helping institutions to do.

In a blog we wrote last year, we set out what we thought were five viable banking business models for the digital age. However, at least three of these new business models were off limit to banks given their organizational constraints. Launching a challenger bank removes those constraints and allows banks to unbundle themselves by launching a narrowly-focused digital proposition (in terms of product offering as well as demographics) and then to rebundle themselves around this proposition. This is what fintech companies like Transferwise, Robin Hood and Zopa have done successfully and we are starting to see banks do the same — like Imagine Bank from Caixa which successfully attracted a new customer demographic with a convenient and high margin savings product and has since rebundled a whole set of own label and third-party services.

Unbundle to Rebundle

There is also the possibility to do this unbundling to rebundling via a holding company model. This represents the digital equivalent of the traditional universal banking model but where each product offering is run by a separate subsidiary. Doing this keeps each unit nimble enough to compete to respond to market shifts, permits partial customer acquisition, but also allows the overall group to achieve economies of scale (both supply-side, like IT, and demand-side, like customer data insights). In banking, the best example of this seems to be Pepper from Bank Leumi, which is building up a set of discrete product propositions.

If an incumbent bank chooses not to launch a challenger bank, what are its options?

It could choose to do nothing, essentially pursuing a mix of tactical options like cutting discretionary spend, shrinking risk-weighted assets and lobbying the regulator to slow, or reverse course on, new legislation. But, even though this might get management through to its next stock option vest, this isn’t a long-term remedy.

Another option could be to go upstream. We see this a lot in wealth management. Since HNWIs want a somewhat bespoke service and interaction with a relationship manager, then a lot of banks are moving to serve exclusively these HNWIs and UHNWIs where they think they can earn good fees for the foreseeable future. However, since many banks — as well as independent asset managers and family-offices-as-a-service focus on the same market — fees are gradually eroding. But more importantly, it leaves the banks open to classic disruptive innovation as the providers who now serve retail and mass affluent customers with digitally native services start themselves to move upstream.

In our view, for the banks that don’t want to launch challenger banks, there are only really two options. One is to become a bank-as-a-service, offering their back office and compliance to other banks and fintech providers, as banks like Bancorp in the US have done. But, this is a low-margin business. A better option is what we call the thin, vertically-integrated bank, where a bank starts to offer third-party services alongside some of its own products, capitalizing on its advantages —a bank licence, trust, the pull of a large customer base — to give its customers more choice. The challenge here is, of course, that this is a radically different business model which is likely to activate the corporate immune system.

Vertically integrated digital bank

So, the conclusion seems to be: if a company can dismantle the corporate immune system for long enough to adapt its existing business, then a challenger bank might not be the right option. Otherwise, it probably is.

Firms need Business Model change, not Blockchain

Firms need business model change, not blockchain

Firms need Business Model Change, not Blockchain

by Ben Robinson | Jun 1, 2018 | 13 minutes read

When Jimmy Song, a venture partner at Blockchain Capital, took to the stage at Consensus two weeks ago (wearing a black cowboy hat), he launched an attack on the blockchain-is-the-answer-to-everything mentality. He said,

“When you have a technology in search of a use, you end up with the crap that we see out there in the enterprise today.”

Jimmy Song
Jimmy Song

Jimmy was clearly trying to be provocative and burst the bubble of blockchain fanatics, but he has a point. It’s not so much about blockchain per se (although this may be where the worst offences are committed) but about the focus on technology in general. Every day we are bombarded with articles about the need to digitize or about how [Blockchain/AI/APIs/Cloud/Mobile/IoT] will transform or disrupt such and such an industry. But we forget that technology in the absence of new business models never changed anything.

UBER Business Model, by Tim O'Reilly
UBER Business Model, by Tim O'Reilly

It wasn’t the internet that transformed retail or music. It wasn’t the smartphone that created Uber. Instead, it took business model change which exploited new technologies. In retail, it was the Amazon business model of one-click checkout, marketplace and next-day delivery. In music, it was the iTunes model of unbundling music to let us buy individual songs and then the Spotify rebundling model of all-you-can-listen streaming subscription service. And Uber didn’t just use the smartphone to let people order cabs (as many of the incumbents did), but instead uses the power of GPS to allow anyone with a car to become a taxi driver, transforming supply in the course of transforming user convenience and experience.

And so in banking we can safely predict that it won’t be blockchain or APIs or AI that transform the industry. Instead, it will be new business models empowered by those technologies.

Implementing technology without a clear plan risks making matters worse

In fact, we could probably go further and say that implementing new technologies without a clear idea of the future business model may make matters worse because it could well entrench existing practices.

The reason for this is that these new technologies will be implemented in support of existing business models rather than in pursuit of new ones. This means — as we have seen so often in banking — that digital technologies are used to digitize analogue products, rather than reinventing them for the digital age. But, it means more importantly that these technologies will be used to double-down on scale.

Economies of Scale Illustrated

The industrial economy was all about scale. Once a company had come up with a winning product, the challenge was to exploit economies of scale as fully as possible. This allowed unit costs to be minimized and allowed firms to undercut rivals, seeing them gain more market share and scale and thereby locking in their leadership position. So all investments were aimed at maximizing scale — mass marketing, mass production, mass distribution — and business were organized into centralized, hierarchical structures to make this possible.

But these investments in scale in the digital age are quickly moving from sources of competitive advantage to sources of competitive disadvantage.

Technology and platforms have neutralized scale advantages

In their recent book, , Hemant Taneja and Kevin Maney talk about how the technologies of cloud and AI have turned scale economies on their head.

In the world of cloud computing, IT resources are available cheaply to everyone meaning that — other than for the platform providers like Microsoft— scale doesn’t matter. A business can rent as little or as much IT as it needs, conferring little scale advantage in running massive operations.

But it’s not just IT resources, the same model is being applied everywhere. Take human resources, it is becoming increasingly easy to contract the people a company needs at the time they need them through platforms such as Malt and through a new breed of companies like  and .

In economic terms, technology has lowered the minimum efficient scale of production to a point that is within the reach of most SMEs. And with a monolithic business structure, diseconomies of scale kick in sooner and are more material.

Artificial Intelligence is also having a profound impact on scale. If new technologies and platforms make it possible to manufacture profitably without scale, AI is making it possible to know what each and every customer wants — so that product and service can be tailored to everyone.

While the slight flaw in the unscaled argument is that more scale leads to more data and more data leads to better AI, it is nonetheless the case that any company offering undifferentiated products at scale will soon lose market share and scale. And so we see white space for new kinds of business models, where firms — or platforms — are able to take advantage of these new technologies to offer mass customization at scale.

The incumbents’ challenge

The incumbents challenge is, therefore, how to move away from this heritage of scale. This is likely a bigger challenge than it seems. Many companies in the industrial age missed shifts in consumer trends, but because of scale they could in many cases afford to catch up — copying rivals, buying rivals, etc.

In this digital age, the scaled business model is likely to lead to the double whammy of failing to spot new trends and the impossibility of catching up. Moreover, scale is so deeply embedded — across company structures, performance metrics, remuneration, processes, employee skillsets, cultures — that it will be so difficult for incumbents to make the transition.

Number of investments in tech companies by country — source Atomico
Number of investments in tech companies by country — source Atomico

And it’s not just an issue facing companies. Take Germany, for instance. For so long, its industrial sector has been admired all over the world for consistently high quality engineering. But, the German economy is struggling to make the transition to the unscaled, digital world. It doesn’t (yet) have a  from which the new unscaled models are emerging and the .

But there is hope. We do see many incumbent companies, including in the banking industry, adopting new, unscaled business models for the digital age.

New banking business models for the digital age

In many ways, the following section is an update  ago looking at how technology and new regulations, particularly PSD 2, were likely to lead to new business models. Where back then we identified 4 business models, now we identify 5 (but now fully discount the universal banking model as a relic of the industrial age). And where back then we framed the choices around asset intensity and profitability, we now frame the choices around the size of the demographic a firm wishes to serve and the number of products it offers to this demographic (although profitability is likely to improve in correlation with these factors).

Let us consider each in turn.

The unbundled start-up

This is the model that most B2C fintech companies have pursued until now. They spot a niche, which could one of: a product that wasn’t previously offered (e.g Coinbase), a demographic that is un- or underserved (e.g Lending Club), a much better experience (with likely cheaper pricing), combining tech and design thinking (e.g Transferwise) or all of the above(e.g. WealthFront).

It is very much the embodiment of an unscaled model: using cloud infrastructure to operate at low volumes and using AI to serve small segments of the market. However, given it is both targeting a niche and targeting the consumer directly, it is often difficult to make this model profitable. The low infrastructure costs are more than offset by high customer acquisition costs which, because these tend to be single product companies, cannot be spread over many revenue lines. There are exceptions, of course, where the regulatory costs are low and the market is large (e.g WorldRemit), where there is a virality in the product design that lowers acquisition costs (e.g Revolut) or where the product solves a big issue in a big market such that it becomes a very large company (PayPal, M-Pesa, Stripe).

The unbundled startup
The unbundled startup

But the much more likely outcome is that successful unbundled start-ups start to bundle multiple products under the same brand.

The rebundled start-up

Once a start-up has found a strong product/market fit, it is logical for it to offer multiple products in order to boost its return on capital by cross-selling and upselling to its existing clients. It effectively moves from a single, unbundled product offering to rebundling a full banking service over time. However, it is different from a traditional universal banking model in a number of ways, such as the fact that it is digitally native but more importantly because it remains focused on serving the same demographic. In that sense, it doesn’t engage in mass marketing and production, but sticks to a narrow target market. Were it to begin to offer all products to all customers, it then risks becoming the victim of unbundling itself.

Unbundle to Rebundle
Unbundle to re-bundle strategy

Examples of successful unblundled to rebundled start-ups include Zopa, Transferwise and Revolut.

The platform model

The platform model is somewhat of an anomaly in this list since it is essentially a scale play. However, it is likely to be an enduring model since:

1/ it is underpinned by strong network effects in a way that the universal banking model isn’t;

2/ it is often executed as part of an unscaled holding company strategy (see later); and,

3/ it is offered in the service of (and helps to make sustainable) the model of unbundled start-ups.

The platform model is simple. Banks rent out their back office as a service to others. For the unbundled start-ups who would be clients, it offers the advantage of not having to undertake a bunch of low value-added regulation and IT activities and it helps them to go beyond just renting IT infrastructure to renting IT applications and compliance. For the banks, it helps them to spread the largely fixed costs of IT and compliance over much larger volumes, improving economics.

Infrastructure Play
Infrastructure Play

The challenge, as pointed out in the last blog, is that this is a difficult model to scale across borders, limiting its profitability potential and meaning that there will be likely only one or two platform players per country/geo.

Examples of this model we have seen so far include Wirecard, Railsbank, Solaris and Bancorp. And it is no surprise that they are cropping up in the largest banking markets first where potential for scale economies is greatest.

The aggregator model

The aggregator model is where a firm uses its grip over distribution to introduce the consumer to the right unbundled services. Effectively it uses AI and machine learning to understand the customer’s financial affairs and preferences and to anticipate their needs so that it can make the right service recommendations at the right time. With the introduction of PSD 2 — and similar regulation across the world — this model becomes easier to operate since it forces banks to share customer data. And, theoretically, it becomes possible to operate this model without engaging in any product manufacturing or without having a banking licence or any compliance team — as firms like Centralway Numbrs are trying to implement.

The Aggregator Model
The Aggregator Model

Nonetheless, our view — consistent with the blog from two years ago — is that this model will be thin, open but vertically integrated. By this we mean that aggregators will work with many different unbundled start-ups, but because of the nature of banking, they will likely manufacture some products — like current accounts that require a banking licence. And because of the need to deliver exceptional customer experience, they will end up having to become more vertically integrated. We , such as with Amazon and Netflix, and now we observe the same thing happening in banking. When unbundled fintech start-ups rebundle, they tend to become more vertically integrated — witness Transferwise’s move off the Currency Cloud platform or N26’s move off Wirecard.

Vertical Bank Business Model
Vertically-integrated, thin digital bank

And so it is not a surprise that the aggregator models we are starting to observe in banking are thin and vertically integrated, such as M-Shwari and Starling Bank.

However, there are a couple of potential issues with the aggregator model. The first might arise from regulation. Will regulators allow banks that offer own-labelled services to aggregate services from third-parties and trust them to do so completely impartially? Especially given the marked tendency for aggregators to move from . Moreover, there may be a business model challenge in that, as , models like Starling’s rely on third-parties while seeking to internalize the network effects, especially around data.

Aggregators vs Platforms
Aggregators vs Platforms adaption of Ben Thompson's diagram

So, while we continue to believe that this is a sound model, aggregators of this type will need to look to empower the ecosystem by externalizing network effects and may seek to use arms-length intermediaries, like Bud, to avoid potential pitfalls around regulation.

And, where these potential issues are not addressed, aggregators leave themselves open to the threat from rebundled start-ups and from holding company models.

The Holding Company Model

The holding company model attempts to replicate the universal banking model — or conglomerate model in other industries — for the unscaled world and in a way that confers competitive advantage on the subsidiaries, especially by dint of network effects.

There is probably no “standard” for the holding company model. Berkshire Hathway is a great example of how a holding company structure can create competitive advantage across the group companies, in its case by using the cashflows and very low cost of capital of its insurance business to provide the cheap cash for investing.

Amazon is another great model to study and probably more relevant for banking. Jeff Bezos made a decision in 2002 to standardize the way information is shared across Amazon using APIs. It was a brilliant move in how to achieve control at scale. Essentially, the inputs and the outputs of every team were measurable in real time, such that their performance was instantly calculable and all other teams would get the information needed to conduct their work without bottlenecks, but it still allowed the teams autonomy in how to execute. The upside of this API model, so well documented in this , was manifold:

  • it allowed the different teams to operate autonomously so that that those business could be opened up to work with third-parties (as happened with AWS)
  • It allowed each unit to be kept focused on its own KPIs, which essentially means that they are forced to remain close to customer trends. As , the genius of Amazon’s customer obsession is that it forces every part of the business to innovate at the same time as making it practically impossible to overshoot consumer demands.
  • It critically allows every business unit to stay focused on its niche (essentially an unscaled model) but allowing for scale at a group level (e.g IT resources, distribution and brand), positive working capital flows, and the exploitation (internalization) of network effects across group companies.

This is what makes Amazon such a formidable company. It has figured out how to make the conglomerate model work in the digital age — through a holding company structure. And, furthemore, in its digital form, it overcomes one of the key shortcomings of its industrial age predecessor — it can achieve increasing returns to scale thanks network effects.

In the financial services space, the best example of this holding company structure is Ant Financial. Where Amazon has figured out how to adapt the conglomerate model for the digital age, Ant Financial has figured out how to recreate the universal banking model for an unscaled world. Its hub and spoke model sees the group leverage data, brand and distribution while the subsidiaries remain narrowly enough focused — on unsecured lending, investing, money market funds — to remain nimble and adaptive in the face of changing technologies and customer trends.

Ant Financial Holding Company
Ant Financial's Business Model as a Holding Company

The Holding Company as a model for reinvention

We see a strong trend in banking for incumbents to launch new digital banks. The examples abound, such as BNP Paribas’ Hello Bank. While this model to reinvention is in many ways sound — it allows these banks to transplant customers and trust into a new digitally native version of themselves — it risks creating another universal banking model, albeit one built on digital foundations. A better way of going about reinvention would seem to be a holding company model. This might be built on a Berkshire Hathaway model, as seems to be the case with Equitable Bank’s creation of its , to create a sticky, low cost source of funds for its lending business. Or, probably more likely, it would be an Ant Financial model of having individual subsidiaries target different business lines, which is the approach that Bank Leumi seems to be taking with Pepper Bank.

Pepper Bank, by Leumi

Conclusion

There is a clear danger that with the constant hype around technology, banks miss the need to redefine their business models before embarking on major technology renovation. In fact, technology renovation in the absence of business model renovation may well make things worse because it would entrench existing business models based on selling undifferentiated products at the greatest possible level of scale. The digital age calls for something else — products, many of which will be new, targeted on specific demographics, made possible now thanks to technology change. In this blog, we have presented 5 models which would work in this new paradigm, of which the holding company offers perhaps the best route to success — especially for incumbent organizations looking to reinvent themselves.

Post-pandemic Wealth Management (#20)

Post-pandemic Wealth Management,
w/ Anna ZAKRZEWSKI, Christine SCHMID, Laurence MANDRILE-AGUIRRE

Your host, Ben Robinson, sits down with Anna Zakrzewski who leads Wealth Management globally, for Boston Consulting GroupChristine Schmid who heads up Strategy at additiv, and Laurence Mandrile-Aguirre — who heads up Switzerland & Monaco for Citi Private Bank. We cover the opportunities around Digital Wealth Management and what that truly means, how ready are wealth managers to take advantage of the shift to Assets under Intelligence, where new entrants fit into the market and what the future of wealth management will be.

Resources mentioned in this podcast:

  1. For Wealth Managers, COVID-19 Is a Wake-up Call” — Boston Consulting Group
  2. Post-pandemic Wealth Management Opportunities” — additiv
  3. What society needs from the financial sector — now more than ever before” — additiv

Full podcast transcript:

 

There is no way that we’re going to go back to a less-digitized world post-COVID19. It will have a lasting impact in that respect, on the client experience, on the way relationship managers and investment advisors interact, but it will also have a lasting impact in terms of how you onboard, how you run KYC, what your future compliance model is going to look like — Anna Zakrzewski

[00:01:57.09] Ben: Anna, thank you very much for coming on the podcast! I want to start with the white paper that you recently issued, called “For Wealth Managers, COVID-19 is a Wake-Up Call”. It begins with the following line:

“Outsiders might think that wealth management, after a 10-year bull market should be in good shape to weather the storm. But this is not what we find.”

Anna, have wealth managers been complacent and failed to prepare for the future while times were good?

Anna: I would say a lot of the topics that we see that wealth managers have to focus on today, they should have already been doing the last two to three years — and I would say they haven’t really done too well in implementing them. Whether they fail to make the world shine, I would say they never really had the huge pressure on which they had to act because margins were still quite okay. On the other side, a lot of them had such a thin profit margin, that right now, with the crisis and with COVID-19, there will be not that much leftover.

[00:02:55.26] Ben: Do you think that they now realize the severity of the situation — i.e. that what we’re facing is a downturn, of course, which will affect assets, but the fact that it’s more than that, that it’s also going to catalyze some bigger structural changes?

Anna: Well, I think what they are realizing is two, three things. The first one that they are realizing is that the topics that they have to act on now, the actions that they have to take on now, are not all necessarily new — with very few exceptions — but they have to accelerate and they actually have to really implement them well. For example, structural cost changes; for example, rethinking how they deliver advice, and actually enabling and embracing the opportunity to work remotely, to work digitally — at the moment, it’s the only way for wealth managers to interact with their clients. And before that, it used to be a threat. So, I think that’s the one bucket.

Anna: The second one, in terms of major structural changes, in the past, most wealth managers have not really embraced and adapted their complete operating model. It’s always been relatively a good business — 10 years of a bull market, a high volume of transactions — which means basically, their long-term view on profits hasn’t really been distracted. So, that also means that they never really had to make more cuts than just little salami slices on their cost and on their operating model — so you have a lot of duplications, you have a lot of complexity, you have a lot of processes that are not necessarily scalable, and most of these structural topics haven’t really been implemented well so far.

the banks that have invested in digitization, they were within a few days able to completely shift 80% of their workforce to working from home, even in functions you wouldn’t have imagined before. They were able to contact, reach out, and provide advice in a digitized, faster way to their clients, far more personalized than anybody else — Anna Zakrzewski

Anna: I think the other catalyst that we see is that after COVID-19, there will be a lasting impact in terms of interactions and also servicing. There is no way that we’re going to go back to a less-digitized world post-COVID. It will have a very lasting impact in that respect, and it will have a lasting impact on the client experience, on the way relationship managers and investment advisors interact, but it will also have a lasting impact in terms of how you onboard, how you run KYC, what your future compliance model is going to look like. These are the three big blocks where we definitely see strong acceleration. And lastly, if you look at the smaller banks and the smaller players in the market, who on average have really high cost:income ratios, the question is, if they will not focus right now, how many of them will really survive? And we actually do expect, as an acceleration, also industry consolidation to start happening.

[00:05:38.20] Ben: What you lay out there is quite a clear blueprint in terms of how wealth managers should be responding. How do you see them responding so far, especially the speed with which they’re now tackling what they arguably should have done a while back?

Anna: What they have been doing quite well — not all of them, but most of them — is the short-term actions directly linked to the COVID crisis: ensuring working from home, ensuring some acceleration on digitization, upgrading a little bit some client experience piece, start to run some scenarios, managed liquidity. I would say those short-term actions — keeping their own people safe and engaged — all of that, I would say that that has been done quite well. The part where they have also, at least some of them, become quite creative, I would say — and some have definitely surprised us — was also how they onboard clients, how they now run KYC, how they now manage compliance and enable work from home, especially in an environment and in a business, where confidentiality and also regulatory elements are very strict. So far, they haven’t been able to even onboard a client remotely, and now, in COVID, some have really been creative. They optimized digital signatures, they were able to do client identification through video calls. Before COVID, nobody really thought video calls, especially around Europe, would be something the clients would want. At the moment, it’s actually one way of getting onboarded. So I think some of these reaction times have been surprisingly quick and surprisingly agile. The thing that hasn’t really gone so well, for some of them, was really the decline in communication. So, some of them where weaker content that was not necessarily personalized it was talking about the crisis, but partially not individualized enough or solution-based — and that is an angle which should have been an opportunity for wealth managers to do really well. And I would say, on average, that part hasn’t been the strongest.

[00:08:05.00] Ben: In your report, you definitely identify that — as you said — is one area where digitization should be able to deliver a much better experience at scale. Do you think now that we’ve had this acceleration and digitalization, that wealth managers appreciate that, and they’re starting to make those kinds of investments? And then, how difficult is it to make longer-term investments in an environment where there’s such a focus on guarding liquidity and managing communication — things that seem so much more pressing?

Anna: There is one major shift in terms of how investments are being done, and also how levers are being prioritized in terms of where the focus and the action of the wealth managers are moving towards. So, to give you one example, one bank actually had a quite broad and ambitious digital roadmap before the crisis — most of the topics and most of the angles were completely focused purely on the front experience, the client experience, and that part. And there was quite a big budget behind it. They have revisited it, not cutting on that client experience piece, but adding a component in the whole digital roadmap, which actually allows them to reduce costs, to unlock some flexibility in the processes, to help them partially in an end-to-end view become more scalable, and through that actually leading to an efficiency increase of up to 20%. And that actually funds the partial investment also into the front and into the client experience piece. So, you see a much stronger balancing of complexity reduction and front client impact. And before COVID, it was mostly focused purely on the front and just on the client — and I think that is just one of the examples that we see in terms of a mindset shift.

Anna: Another one that is very interesting is, how do you ensure that you have a stable and continuous revenue flow mid to long term. And it’s about really thinking how you make your clients more sticky, how you make your clients stay with you and invest more money with you by truly tailoring on the one-hand side, and on the other side, also making parts of the portfolios in a short term — and it’s not easy — a bit less volatile to potential upcoming future shake-ups. But that’s, I think, one of the big notions. And in terms of reassuring — and, I guess, it also goes in that way — is, in times of crisis or COVID right now, with everybody working from home, you also have quite a large part of your employees in marketing and events or in the client front-facing angle, not necessarily being able to do what they’ve been doing before. So, some players have actually done a creative approach in rethinking and re-skilling some of their employees to now help where you have the big bulk of the work happening, driven by COVID, and allow them a more flexible engagement across the organization, and it actually puts them in a nice position to now experiment what their future working models could look like.

if you actually look at wealth managers today, they are still very strongly vertically integrated and it will require quite a change of mindset to let go of what is not core, in terms of, you know, “We do our own products”, “We build our own app”, “We have our own reporting”, instead of actually leveraging some of the players that are out there in the market — Anna Zakrzewski

[00:11:33.29] Ben: Going into the pandemic, we’re already starting to see a growing differential in performance between those wealth managers that have made big investments in digitalization — I think you call them ‘digital leaders’ in your report — and on the other side, those that hadn’t yet made those type of big investments in digitization. Presumably, that differential in performance is getting magnified during the pandemic, do we already have any evidence that that’s happening, or is it too early to see that divergence in performance?

Anna: You already have seen that divergence in performance before the crisis — and that’s a fundamental difference in performance. So, we have looked at 150 wealth managers last year, across the globe, in all business models, in all shapes and sizes, and we have also looked at the top performers in terms of profitability. There are two major differences that really make the top performers, top performers. First of all, they absolutely excel in the revenue margin because they already, through digitization, are able to deliver better to the client, cross-sell better, they have the right tools, and they really focus their front to deliver. Plus, they have also redefined their pricing model. And the difference, globally, I mean, we’re talking about a delta of approximately — depending on the regions — 15 to 18 basis points. So, it’s really significant. And these top performers, they also invest double and have invested double the amounts in digitization over the course of the last two to three years. So, there is a direct correlation already, before the crisis.

Anna: And thirdly, what was a very insightful angle for us was, we also looked at the cost difference — is the cost over assets of those top performers significantly different than the one of the average? And the third proof point here is that, actually, the difference globally-seen is something like three or four basis points, so it’s not as significant as on the revenue side. But the reason for that is that these top performers have already started to invest: they have invested into the changes in operating model, they have invested into the new talent, into the new and accelerated ways of working and, like I said, double the amount in digitization, not just in the front, but across the value chain.

[00:13:59.29] Ben: Is it too early to have any data points from the pandemic?

Anna: I wouldn’t say it’s too early. One thing that you already see is that the banks that have invested in digitization, they were within a few days able to completely shift 80% of their workforce working from home, even in functions you wouldn’t have imagined before. They were able to contact, reach out, and provide advice in a digitized faster way to their clients, far more personalized than anybody else because they could just review the portfolios. So yes, they were clearly at an advantage when the pandemic hit the market.

[00:14:39.24] Ben: But we don’t yet have data points on financial performance, right?

Anna: No. On financial performance, we don’t have it yet. However, in terms of onboarding clients, in terms of winning new business, in terms of maintaining clients, and in terms of tailored communication, this is what we see, these were the players that have been able to do that better than the others.

Let’s not forget that the customer acquisition cost is quite high. So, I wouldn’t necessarily see the digital players being the consolidators in the market. I would see some of the bigger players trying to acquire the capabilities of the digital players or even more, a partnership model where some of the traditional players have great access to clients and they do have the client relationships, to actually tap into the digital capabilities of the other players, to have it as an integrated service model and as an integrated offering towards these clients — Anna Zakrzewski

[00:15:02.11] Ben: We talked a bit about what digital servicing looks like. What about analytics and the capabilities that wealth managers are using there, in order to build more tailored products for customers? How strong would you say the data analytical capabilities were of wealth managers? And do you think this might be one area where they’re at risk from some of the digitally-native new entrants?

Anna: So, it’s maybe a bold statement, but I don’t think wealth managers yet are really very advanced and reaping the full benefits of the power of analytics today. So, I think that’s where they are, compared to other financial services places. With a few that can already do it, a lot of the times it’s still a bit of analytics here and a bit of analytics there, but very few have a truly centralized data lake, which allows them to on one-hand side, fully personalize their client interface, fully personalize their offering and the value proposition to each one of the clients, and thirdly, also, leverage analytics to allow them to scale up their processes and operating model. So, what we hear more is that the analytics capabilities will significantly accelerate now, in terms of enabling cross-sell, enabling pricing, taking into account client price sensitivities when we’re thinking value proposition design, etc. It’s going to really be a big focus now, and before the pandemic, I would say it’s been there — it’s been a great buzzword — but in very few cases it has been truly implemented, end to end. In Asia, I would say, yes, it’s been there, and it’s been definitely in the tech fins and in the more technology-averse digital wealth managers, it’s been playing to their complete advantage. In Europe, we’re still quite far away from that.

[00:17:10.10] Ben: One other aspect of the report I wanted to pick up on, was that I think you said this also, “in addition to changing operating models and servicing models, banks should also look at their sourcing models. But rather than just try to source things that are cheaper, they should also tap an ecosystem of partners to help deliver improving quality at scale.” I totally agree with what you’re saying, but it’s such a difficult area to get buy-in from banks because this is something that potentially threatens to cannibalize existing revenue streams. And so, I guess the question is, do you think that, culturally, banks and wealth managers are ready to look at changing their sourcing models in that kind of way, to actually insource even parts of their asset management?

Anna: When you mean sourcing, like outsource parts of their asset management? That’s what you mean, right?

Ben: Yes, outsource functions to India because they’re low cost. What about finding somebody who could offer a better-automated investment service than the one the bank has, for example.

Anna: I guess what wealth managers are facing today is a true definition of what their core competencies are and it is not like a process or your technology is going to be a key differentiator for you to win in the future. And we already see today that some wealth managers and private banking players are actually setting a primary focus on client servicing and investment servicing while some of the rest in the value chain, in terms of the middle back office, etc, is already quite radically and can be even more radically outsourced to third-party providers. On the other side, if you actually look at wealth managers today, they are still very strongly vertically integrated and it will require quite a change of mindset to let go of what is not core, in terms of, you know, “We do our own products”, “We build our own app”, “We have our own reporting”, instead of actually leveraging some of the players that are out there in the market. So, I would expect going forward, to also accelerate some of the changes that need to happen and accelerate some of the digitization elements that have to happen, that actually FinTechs — who are very focused on individual capabilities — will be a great source to pool and a great source to actually integrate to deliver some of these capabilities required.

The large wealth managers will clearly gain in market share, but they will only be able to do that if they do the right investments and the right level of personalization and client experience, and they will also act quite fast. The broad middle play, they will only survive if they stop being a big-bang, but they will also really refocus and turn around the operating model — Anna Zakrzewski

Anna: And then, the question is, in the future, what will wealth managers be? Will they be the ones that focus on wealth management, financial wellness, client experience? Will they be the players that will have everything in-house across the value chain? And then, the challenge is how do they get to scale in terms of the number of clients, etc. to really put the volume on their platform. And then you will have the players that actually are purely driven by technology — which are the tech fin and the digital wealth managers who actually are already having the digitized business model and don’t yet have the direct access to the customers.

[00:20:30.25] Ben: You said earlier on that you expect consolidation in this market because what COVID and then subsequently what an acceleration digitalization will do, is it will clearly separate the winners from those that are less strong and less able to adapt. How soon do you think that phase of consolidation will happen? And is it just the question of the large consuming the small or is it more nuanced? And then, if you allow me a third question, do digital leaders really need to buy assets? Because won’t superior value add just see them win those customers anyway, from those that aren’t able to provide that kind of value add?

Anna: Let me take one question at a time and try to bundle it. Today, nearly half of all wealth managers have a cost:income ratio of over 80% and some are close to 100, which means they’re already not very profitable today. The degree and the speed of consolidation, in our view, will depend on the severity of the crisis and also on how long the crisis will last. What we see is that size and profitability are definitely correlated, although, also here we see some examples of small boutique banks that are very successful and they are very focused.

Anna: So in terms of the speed at which consolidation will happen, comparing it to the previous crisis from 2008–2009, we have seen the big shift in terms of reduction, in terms of the number of wealth managers, approximately 18–24 months post the crisis. Now, in times of COVID, I would partially expect an even earlier kick-in of the M&A and consolidation wave driven by two drivers. The first one is, already today, a lot of wealth managers that were strong before the crisis are thinking and seeing this as an opportunity how in a relatively short period of time, they can acquire scale and acquire capability to make them stronger post-COVID — And typically, you will have 15 to 20% of players that come out stronger after the crisis. So, they will be the consolidation drivers and they have already started to screen and look for these opportunities, partially, today. And then, you will have the ones that will be so severely hit because they’ve already been in such a poor position before the crisis, that it’s going to be more a matter of decision, when do they sell to still get good value compared to how long can they last to somehow keep their business afloat. And this balance, I think, is going to drive the speed at which the consolidation wave will start.

Anna: On your other question, we already see today that some of the large wealth managers have significantly grown in the share of the market that they owned in the past few years. So, yes, it’s definitely going to be the mid-sized and larger players acquiring some of the smaller ones, which on average, are, today more unprofitable than some of the larger players, of course, because of the scalability of their business. But, like I said before, we will always have a few small boutique plays and niche plays that will continue to be very successful, already like we have today. But they are very focused.

[00:24:09.13] Ben: And then, the last question was around whether it’s actually necessary. So, the really successful digital leaders in this space, do they need to buy up the frail competition, or can they just take their customers through better execution anyway?

Anna: Okay. So, a lot of the pure digital players that we have in the market today, they have simple and nice, pragmatic client experience. They are very customer-oriented and friendly, but what they do not have is access to the clients. And let’s not forget that the customer acquisition cost is quite high. So, I wouldn’t necessarily see the digital players being the consolidators in the market. I don’t see that. I would rather see some of the bigger players trying to acquire the capabilities of the digital players or even more a partnership model where some of the more traditional players have great access to clients and they do have the client relationships, to actually tap into the digital capabilities of the other players, to have it as an integrated service model and as an integrated offering towards these clients. I don’t believe that the entrants such as robot advisors are actually going to be acquiring the smaller chunks of the clients that we see in the wealth managers today that may be up for sale at some point in time.

[00:25:36.23] Ben: What do you think the end state is? Does the middle just disappear? And what’s the final number of wealth managers you think we’ll have, once this consolidation phase is over?

Anna: Once we will definitely see in the future that the long tail of small wealth managers will actually disappear and only a few boutique plays will remain. The large wealth managers will clearly gain in market share, but they will only be able to do that if they do the right investments and the right level of personalization and client experience, and they will also act quite fast. The broad middle play, they will only survive if they stop to be a big bang, but they will also just really refocus and turn around the operating model — be it outsourced or be it really focused on a few segments and a few real credible value propositions.


The digital entrants focus on the younger population, most of them. I haven’t seen a digital entrant that focuses on retired persons yet — Christine Schmid

[00:26:33.27] Ben: Christine, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. Let’s maybe start by asking you, what is additiv?

Christine: Thanks a lot, Ben! Additiv is a technology company. It was established in ’98 and it helps the leading financial institutions to capitalize on digitization. The most known product is the Digital Finance Suite — that’s an orchestration engine for wealth management in particular. Newly, we have launched the KickStarter campaign that’s even a faster enablement for wealth managers to digitize. Additionally, it provides some expert systems, basically data analytics, but also credit tools. I would say it is global, excluding the US — this has some regulatory reasons — the US is a beast of its own. So, it is doing business out of Zurich, Singapore, Nairobi, and Frankfurt.

[00:27:25.17] Ben: And what’s it like trying to sell technology to banks and wealth managers at the moment during a global pandemic?

Christine: I think it’s the right time. For the ones that haven’t set up a servicing model through digital channels — i.e. where their advisors could serve their client through digital means — they’re doomed.

[00:27:47.16] Ben: So you’re saying almost counter-intuitively that this has actually risen to the top of their corporate agenda because, quite simply, they can’t service their customers in this environment without better technology?

Christine: I would say so, for the ones that are very still more towards the old dine & wine, that’s really over.

[00:28:05.02] Ben: Okay. Let’s assume they have the motivation to implement new technology and they have the budget even in the pandemic to implement new technology. How can they do it practically, if the IT staff are working remotely?

Christine: Working remotely doesn’t harm work. It just shifted. And, if you look for the wealth managers, they were used, I would say, on the IT staff side to work out of different locations — that’s common standard. So, just to give you an example, we were able with a large Swiss bank and it’s public with post finance to launch their new digital wealth advice during the pandemic. So, that’s no limitation at all, in particular, if you talk to IT staff on their side.

[00:28:55.11] Ben: So, Christine, before working at additiv, you used to work in the industry, right? You were in the wealth management industry. What’s your view on how bad a financial correction we’re looking at and how that will affect the wealth management industry?

Christine: So, yes, we will have a negative correction. We don’t know if it’s a V or a U or a W in the end, but it looks definitely like a correction. The numbers that are coming out from either the banks, on their estimate, but also from the IMF, are simply staggering. So, how does that affect wealth management? Certainly, we will have to refocus back on trust in quality, and people will focus more on the preservation of capital. But the line with what I would call stability and service at a fair level, at a fair price, a second thing is what we would expect and we see that also on the government side, is a refocus towards more sustainable investing again. It is already growing like there is no tomorrow but it will continue. So, if you look on the government side, they link their lending, often these days, to a greener approach of doing business. The same will happen on the investment side — this will continue. And on the retail side, I think we need tools in wealth management that allow for saving, that combine it with budgeting, and that have it in a transparent and fairly-priced way. I think the term that is often used and coming out of the UK where I hear it from often, is financial well-being. It’s really, on the retail side, how helping to save, but also helping to fund through a more difficult time on the economic side for every retail client.

I think that’s the ‘new’ normal model we see throughout various countries in Europe, in particular as well, Switzerland. They team up. It has become a ‘together’ and not only an ‘against’ — Christine Schmid

[00:30:51.03] Ben: You recently published a report on post-pandemic wealth management, and I think we’ve seen a number of these types of reports come out, where people try to anticipate what the future holds. And so, there’s a bit of that in your report. But the other thing I really liked about it is, you actually explain what you mean by digital wealth management — because I think a lot of times people either just assume we know what is meant by digitization or they — for me — minimize what it is and just assume it’s about, as you say, servicing clients through digital channels. So, can we start by having you explain what you think and what additiv thinks is digital wealth management?

Christine: Let me explain it from two views — first of all, from the view of a bank for wealth management, and secondly, then, from a client view. From the view of a bank, it transforms its business model. We always say, at additiv, it changes the operating model, it changes the servicing model, and it changes the sourcing model. So, operating model, it allows a cheaper production on wealth management. It allows on the servicing side an easier, simpler interaction with advisors to the clients, even taking all the regulatory means we have out there into account. And, on the sourcing side, it allows that you benefit from an engine in between, an orchestration engine in between, that already sources either the best partners for solutions or the best investments for solutions — and you can build upon that. So, you don’t have to do it on your own. And these three layers together, it’s not only wealth management; for the banks, it makes the risk management easier, it makes the compliance side easier, but also the audit side easier. So, it’s really various layers where it helps — coming back to where it all had begun — to transform the business model. That’s from a bank’s point of view.

Christine: From a client point of view, digitization in wealth management is partially about democratizing. It’s, from an exclusive offering, open to a broader number of clients. Honestly, it allows, as well, to produce cheaper, it allows as well to have lower fees in and lower costs. It can be personalized. So, in the past, you had a fantastic product and this fantastic product had to fit for a majority of your customers. You know more about the customers by combining different data sources and you can start to personalize that, you can start to personalize the offering, the information you provide. It’s not only that it has to be included within the e-banking but also it can be banking as a service. So, it has to be of becoming even more seamless to include it, for example, in a super app where you do all the transactions as a client, but you have banking services as well, aligned. This is how we break it up. But it will always be about trust, it will always be about a safe way to store your wealth. What is newly added — it has to be convenient. So, where the clients do their transaction they expect, as well, banking — and it has to provide a value add. I think that’s where digitization or digital wealth management really changes from the old world.

[00:34:21.24] Ben: Essentially, the trade-off that used to exist between quality on the one hand and scale on the other has sort of disappeared. We can provide better quality at better scale or higher scale. Would you say that’s fair?

Christine: And to lower assets under management levels. So, to lower levels of wealth per end client.

If you look in the Western world, pensions had quite a decent level of cost of living covered. The risk is, with the demographic pattern we have, with the lack of reforms we have seen, but also with the low interest rate level, you face a pension gap in which your targeted cost of living will not be covered by your pension anymore, and thus, you have to find a way to decumulate your wealth during the retirement period in a most efficient way, by not giving up completely on risk, by having the right investment products, which then allows you to live a life free of financial concerns. That’s a huge opportunity— Christine Schmid

[00:34:40.03] Ben: And in that kind of world, it would suggest that we can provide wealth management to a much larger population of customers? And so, how much bigger do you think we could grow the addressable market? Because I guess, most of what we talked about up until now is how we’re talking about a crisis in reduction in assets. But, on the flip side, if this accelerates the push to digitalization, then it also accelerates the opening up of a much bigger market for those wealth managers that can capitalize on that shift.

Christine: It’s a huge opportunity. It allows the scale — be it either self-serve with call center or with an advisor behind. At the moment, the only small amount is really advised of the assets out there. If you take the growth we are expecting in Southeast Asia but also partially the growth we are expecting in Africa, it’s really a super, super multiplier. So, from today’s around 50 million of people that really are fully advised, certainly at a lower scale of complexity, up to nicely into the 1.7 billion number of people — if you can scale it properly.

Ben: So, I’m not going to try to do the maths but that’s, as you say, it’s a big multiplier.

Christine: It will come at a different price tag and it will come obviously for way lower assets on the management per client, but there is where digitization helps to open their client groups.

[00:36:09.15] Ben: And what’s the share of your business that’s coming from existing wealth managers versus new entrants? You’ve got kind of all the right ingredients for new entrants here because you’ve got a large profit pool, fast-changing technology, fast-changing customer needs, which would suggest that there’s a once-in-a-generation kind of opening for new entrants. To what extent are you working with new entrants? And to what extent do you think they can enter the market successfully and build trust?

Christine: We are working with both sides. With new entrants, in particular on the pension side, it is not that simple because it is a highly regulated area. But they’re faster in terms of the platforms and the offerings. And normally, the new entrants then offer their model as a white label for the incumbents, so they follow fast behind. I think that’s the normal model we see throughout various countries in Europe, in particular as well, Switzerland. So they team up. It has become a ‘together’ and not only an ‘against’. Payment was different. On the payment side in particular, if you look at the case of Revolut, this was different because it really heated into a highly profitable area of foreign exchange. But here, it’s more a collaboration and a service model in the interest of the end clients.

[00:37:34.24] Ben: You’re saying that so far new entrants are more friend than foe, but how hard would it be either for banks to replicate these kinds of simple digital services that new entrants have provided? And also, how hard would it be for these new entrants to move up the value chain towards larger, higher net worth customers?

Christine: For the bank, if they start on a greenfield, it is doable. For the bank, if they integrated into their existing systems, it is rather expensive and a long-term project. So, it really depends on the incumbent side how willing they are to start businesses from scratch and maybe even cannibalize some of their still attractive earnings streams. How easy is it for the new entrants to scale up? We are seeing most of the digital banks, really, at the boundaries of wealth, I would say. They started with payment. They had a lot of success by cannibalizing into high-profit areas like foreign exchange. Now, they are really at the border of wealth management.

Ben: Barbarians are at the gate, as it were.

Christine: At the gate, exactly! They’re at the gate of wealth management. And what we see is they’re not growing as they were originally expecting, and this has really to do with the trust where you store your wealth. If you have a chatbot on the other side that sends you in circles, or if you at least can call a call center, or can call your advisor, that’s different. That’s really a difference. So there are some limitations in Europe. In the US, we have seen a completely different picture. If you look at the aims of Acorns, for example, they’ve entered in particular the 401k business quite successfully, and they’re growing nicely there.

[00:39:27.17] Ben: What you’re saying is, to be truly digital requires a business model change, and to some extent, is going to involve cannibalizing existing revenue streams. But, what you’re also saying about the additiv system, if I understand it correctly, is this can be introduced in a much more phased fashion, right? So in other words, you can both help banks to deal with the immediate need to service customers better, but also provide a simpler route to fundamentally changing their operating and sourcing model over time. Would you say that’s fair? So you can either, for those that are really progressive, they can immediately switch to a new business model with a new operation, a new business venture. But for those that are a bit more conservative, they can do it in a phased fashion using additiv’s orchestration engine.

Christine: Absolutely. So, the beauty is that they can transform their business model in steps if they want to, or they can even become more aggressive. The way it is built, if you look at the hybrid wealth management, it’s really tailored to a new servicing model. New servicing model by allowing working from home and serve the client as best as possible, and certainly better than through a simple phone call. At the same time, you could go fully towards accumulation robo, even being more aggressive out there, in the wealth management side, combining with other sourced options. So, it allows both.

[00:40:56.16] Ben: Decumulation versus accumulation. Why is that decumulation opportunity A so big and B, as you wrote in your report, so overlooked up until now?

Christine: Accumulation is growing wealth. So, you start to save preferably as early as possible, at the age of 25, and you grow your wealth through savings and obviously through smart investing over time, towards where you start to live partially from the wealth you have accumulated. It also can be that you grow your wealth at a young age and then start to decumulate because you start your own venture — for example, startup — or you go traveling around the globe for 12 months and you have saved 20K and you want to live off that for a year. Things like that are possible. That wealth will be decumulating — a reduction of wealth. Why is decumulation these days such a large opportunity? Why has it been neglected till now? If you look in the Western world, pension had quite a decent level of cost of living covered. The risk is, with the demographic pattern we have, with the lack of reforms we have seen, but also with the low interest rate level — which we now had for quite some years — you face a pension gap so that your targeted cost of living will not be covered by your pension anymore, and thus, you have to find a way to decumulate your wealth during the retirement period in a most efficient way, by not giving up completely on risk, by having the right investment products, which then allows you to live a life free of concern or free of financial concerns. That’s a huge opportunity. If you look into numbers, the gap is estimated up to 400, I think it’s trillions — a staggering number — which will be needed to close the gaps, either through savings, but also through smart investment offerings.

The paradigm we worked alongside was optimizing for return. Well, the problem was that not all the costs were internalized. That was really the problem — the costs that were taken by society and, in particular, by the planet. And if all the costs would have been taken in properly, certainly then, the financial market would have priced it differently. And therefore, it’s really the goal of the financial industry to start to not only recommend sustainable investments, but also to lend on the corporate lending side, according to the rules that take this cost into account— Christine Schmid

[00:43:04.01] Ben: If you look at all the FinTech entrants into Wealth Management, they seem to be mostly focused on accumulation — people like wealth from betterment. Why so few people focus on decumulation?

Christine: I think it’s a natural pattern. The digital entrants focus on the younger population, most of them. I haven’t seen a digital entrant that focuses on retired persons yet — maybe that’ll come, but I haven’t seen that yet. So, obviously, if you focus on a client group — 20 to 40 years old — you do not look into decumulation into pension savings, yet; you look into accumulation. You want these fun products, these easy to use, you want to cover traveling — or you wanted, in the past, to cover traveling — and foreign exchange, payments made easy; it’s the lifestyle that covers to that age group. Therefore, obviously, the ones entering that market were not focused on the needs of the elderly population. But also we all become older at some point. And, if you look at the age of 55 into your pension, it’s too late to cover the gap. You have to start earlier. We believe this is a huge trend and wouldn’t be surprised if market entrants not only start to look into accumulation but also on the way to build up into retirement. The best example will be Acorns, with its 401k plans. They do that. It’s still in the accumulation phase, but at some point, their clients will be retired. It might take a bit longer if they’re 25 years old today, but they will be retired, so it will become a normal business for them.

Assets under intelligence, how we call it, or return on intelligence, it’s not using only an investment product per se, but using multiple data sets, combining them and then giving even more personalized advice, optimized risk advice, and therefore, as well as optimized returns. So, it’s not the product per se that’s in focus. It’s really the whole construction within wealth management, but also other data sets around, that are more important to advise the clients going forward — Christine Schmid

[00:44:49.21] Ben: One of the concepts that I really, really liked in the report — in fact, it goes as far as to say I loved it — is this pivot in value proposition from being about return on assets to being about return on intelligence. Can you just go into slightly more detail about what that fundamental shift is in the value proposition of wealth managers?

Christine: In terms of the return on assets, you look at your assets under management, and you look at the profitability of the investment products that could have been sold within that group of assets under management. And obviously, therefore, the focus was on the best products to source. The best advice, then, to give to the clients that the level of sales, with hopefully, the best product was the highest. We expect this to change. Assets under intelligence, how we call it, or return on intelligence, it’s not using only an investment product per se, but it’s using multiple data sets. It’s combining it and it’s giving even more personalized advice, it can give even optimized risk advice, and therefore, as well as optimized returns. So, it’s not the product per se that’s in focus. It’s really the whole construction within wealth management, but also other data sets around, that are more important to advise the clients going forward than simply the pure investment product focus.

[00:46:28.18] Ben: You don’t see that many wealth managers yet ready to cannibalize their business. How ready do you see wealth managers are to take advantage of this move to return on intelligence, which presupposes that they’re ready to take this role as a kind of concierge and act to introduce customers to all sorts of different products and services?

Christine: The shift towards return on intelligence, that’s something they’re very keen on doing. It is linked, obviously — and we briefly touched upon base — before it was well linked to the whole area of sustainable investing. Sustainable investing has a lot of intelligence behind to select the right investments, but also the willingness if an investment wasn’t or hasn’t proven as sustainable to shift the transparency therein, I think the banks are really willing to go that extra route, as well to unbundle. At the moment, we have a clear shift towards ETFs and index products, but we don’t know what’s really in there — the detailed level of know-how we have per index is limited. And therefore, there will be another layer of intelligence that you could add, but really looking into the portfolio, unbundling all the ETFs, unbundling all the indices and adding it up then, again, on investment level. And guess what? You might be surprised by some concentration risk that’s in a client portfolio. And you might advise the client differently. That’s another level of adding intelligence to advice or combining it with payment data. If you know the client’s behavior on the consumer side, on the consumption side, you might know products a client would like, so you can, again, use this intelligence and provide it in a better way. Or, last but not least — and I think the industry has discussed that for quite a long time — you bring the intelligence of various clients — clients behaving the same — together and leveraging that for every single client.

[00:48:42.04] Ben: Last question. So, we’ve talked, I think, reasonably narrowly about wealth management. But I wanted to, if you’re okay with it, to zoom out and talk about another paper that you recently issued, which was about the changing needs of society when it comes to financial services. Financial services haven’t provided the insight that it needs to, and have those needs become more urgent in light of the pandemic?

Christine: The big question mark, is it the financial services who haven’t provided it, or is it the general economic, academic rules we are all behaving alongside? The paradigm we worked alongside was optimizing of return. Well, the problem was that not all the costs were internalized. That was really the problem — not all the costs that were taken by society and, in particular, by the planet. And if all the costs would have been taken properly, certainly then, the financial market would have priced it differently. And therefore, it’s really the goal of the financial industry to start to not only recommend sustainable investments but also to lend on the corporate lending side, according to the rules that take the cost into account. For the society to live on this planet — and I believe we just have one; there is no alternative, no planet B — the financial sector has a key role because it’s still the engine that keeps the funding alive. So, from savings, deposits into lending, into economic growth, into job creation. And obviously, this cycle has to be profitable, yes, but at the same time it has to take the costs for society and has to take the costs for the planet — climate change is a big topic — into account.

[00:50:45.17] Ben: So that was my last question, but as it turns out, it was actually my penultimate question because, how do we do that? How do we take those externalities and bake them into the price of assets and transactions?

Christine: How do you do that? That’s the question this industry is looking into, for the last 20 years. If you use the market to do it, then you would need to take the majority funding for each corporate. And the majority of funding for a corporate normally is bonds, and not equity. So I’m a big believer in the international capital market — the ICMA — rules for green bonds and for social bonds. These are rule sets that are not only legally enforceable but also international. So, if a corporation can issue a bond under a green bond ruleset the requirements have to be clear and they have to fulfill that. And the market, then, can price a green bond more attractive than a normal bond from the same company.

Christine: So, let’s take, for example, Volkswagen. They want to fund a new plant where they build the new e-cars. The new plant has to be according to certain standards — the buildings are done — but also about alternative energy use, so solar panels on the roof — all that set. They get cheaper funding than if they built a plain vanilla plant next to a nuclear power plant, for example. It’s a very basic example but you start to shift the funding towards greener, towards more social — by social I mean, for example, if you have to fund the bond for Inditex — and obviously, they have to fulfill certain rules in the way their clothing is produced, even if it comes from Bangladesh. And only if these rules are fulfilled, they are controlled, then they can issue the bond under these standards and they can issue cheaper. And the more the companies shift toward that standard, the more the rest in the old style will become expensive. That’s a way of market mechanism starting to include the pricing and using the market to do the pricing. Because what’s not working out there, if we’re trying to find out who is doing what and externalize the price into, this won’t be of thrive, this is not working. And through the bond side and through the debt side, you could use the market mechanism to start a pricing mechanism. That’s important.


If anything, this crisis has indeed accelerated the way we look at the digital world — Laurence Mandrile-Aguirre

[00:53:33.02] Ben: So, Laurence, I wanted to start off by just asking, what, so far, as we’re living through this pandemic, has been the hardest thing for you to manage in your job?

Laurence: Coordinating everything. We had to adjust to a lot of changes. Usually, when we need to adjust to change, it’s about your manager is changing or something is changing — but one element. In this case, we had to adjust to how we deal with clients, how we ensure continuity in the way we service our clients, how we deal with our people, understand their personal circumstances, how we communicate among each other internally. So, it’s more of making sure that we had everything under control to ensure continuity of business. And I must say that on the technology aspect, it took us a few days, but because we are a global bank, and we are used to having people traveling all over the world and working from a laptop, we were pretty well set up. The challenge was more coordination with the clients and the people.

[00:54:48.18] Ben: Because, I suppose it was not only with the normal channels of communication disrupted, but at that very time, you probably needed to speak more often with customers and with employees or with coworkers than normal because they needed reassurance and so on. Is that true? Would you say that’s a fair statement that, at the very time you needed to speak most and communicate most, the mechanisms you would ordinarily use for communication were disrupted?

Laurence: Absolutely! I mean, in a very short period of time, we had to get used to a lot of technology-related jargon — how to connect, which system to use, are we on the cloud, are we on the network, are we inside our own safe environment at work, terms of network. And the same for clients. Our clients are ultra-high net worth. They are global citizens, they travel a lot. They were not necessarily used to dialing to Zoom. They were used to go to a meeting and meet actual people, so we had to revisit entirely how we communicate among each other internally — it’s important as well — because we needed to be mindful of the bandwidth that we were using; audio/video had consequences on the network. And with customers as well. But, I must say that it took about a week or two to get used to this, and it’s almost common practice now.

I think digital is the way forward, and it was clear to the wealth management community even before this crisis. But it’s also a world that is constantly evolving. There are new technologies all the time. Things are being tested — whether it’s blockchain or artificial intelligence to see how we can use our clients’ preferences or behaviors to deliver a better tools to service them more efficiently. But definitely, I don’t think clients would want us to go back after this crisis and be less digital — Laurence Mandrile-Aguirre

[00:56:35.10] Ben: Yeah. I was reading somewhere that it takes something like 60 days for people to form new habits. Would you say that your customers and your team members have formed new habits? And to some extent, even if we could get back to normal, we won’t go back to the way things were exactly before the crisis.

Laurence: We have completely reorganized the way we communicate. So, we have large forums internally where we like to communicate the important features and the decisions that we are taking for the Private Bank. And, at the same time, we have smaller forums where everybody can voice their own concerns and ask their own questions. And I think we are going to keep that for a while because, obviously, in Switzerland, the economy has reopened. But, at the same time, we have not sent anybody back to the office. We are thinking about the safety of employees. So, we will need to continue communicating that way, definitely, for a longer period of time. And even when we will be able to go back to the office — we’re trying not to say ‘go back to work’ because we feel we are efficiently working — but when we go back to the office, because of the distancing and the security measures, I don’t think we will be able to do large meetings anyway and it will be from our desks, and therefore, phones and videos will continue to be the way forward.

[00:58:21.15] Ben: Looking back on this, you can argue whether this was a black swan or a white swan, whether we should have anticipated or not, or whether we couldn’t have anticipated this crisis. So, we’ll leave that question aside for a second. But, I guess, if we could just argue that what the pandemic is doing in some form is just accelerating the pace of digitization, right? So, we’re moving much quicker than was the case before the crisis in terms of remote work and digital interactions. Do you think that the wealth management community could have been better prepared, and maybe should have made more investments in this digital future while the times were good and ahead of this crisis?

for large banks, I would say — and Citi is focusing on the ultra-high net worth, what we are trying to do is to focus on keeping the full-service offering. That’s very important to us. Therefore, when we look at technology and outperformance, it’s under a more strategic long-term basis. — Laurence Mandrile-Aguirre

Laurence: Well, what I would say is that for sure, there was a strong level of awareness of the disruptive technologies — the need to become digital. We were all exploring our options. I would say that the smaller players could benefit from adding some new digital tools quite easily and for larger wealth managers it had to be compatible with a broader network and system. But I think we’ve been spending a lot of time looking at the options that were around us, how we could become more digital, how we could use AI in the way we improve client’s experience, the tools that we make available internally to our bankers. And we actually created a group called the Investment Innovation Lab, dedicated to that. So that’s what they were doing all the time — talking to FinTech companies, technology companies, looking at the new options, and what could take us forward. If anything, this COVID-19 crisis has indeed accelerated the way we look at the digital world. Just to give you an example, we had started to onboard clients digitally, but we still had a few hurdles to overcome. Most of the time, it was around regulatory requirements that we couldn’t fulfill completely easily. So the fact that we had to work from home triggered a lot of conversation to solve these points and basically, we managed to be 100% digital in onboarding and opening new clients in a week, while if we had not had this crisis, we would be probably still trying to work on the hurdles. So it has accelerated, definitely.

[01:01:20.02] Ben: So clearly, the most pressing problems that the bank is solving very quickly, like, how do we onboard a customer completely digitally? But, do you think you now prioritize more digital spending, particularly for things that are deeper down the technology stack, or for things that affect not just client servicing, but also the operating model and the sourcing model of the bank? So, do you think now there’s an appetite to make bigger investments in digital beyond the stuff that you absolutely had to do because you couldn’t function as normal without it?

Laurence: Absolutely. I think digital, anyway, is the way forward, and it was clear to the wealth management community, I’m pretty sure, even before this crisis. So, all this has just been an accelerator, and I’m pretty sure we will lock in what we’ve managed to achieve in that field. But it’s also a world that is constantly evolving. There are new technologies all the time. Things are being tested — whether it’s blockchain, which is a technology we use a lot at Citi — or artificial intelligence to see how we can use our clients’ preferences or behaviors to deliver a better system or better tools to service them more efficiently. But definitely, I don’t think clients would want us to go back and be less digital, especially the new generation and the millennials that are used to connect and access everything — and making information available efficiently and quickly is very important.

[01:03:12.24] Ben: Would you say that you’re clear on what the next big priority is in the digital journey for your bank?

Laurence: It’s clear we have a full team dedicated to exploring our options and are talking to technology companies all the time. If anything, a big portion of our budget, I know, goes to technology and anything digital. So, I have no doubt that we will continue to lead in that field. Absolutely.

[01:03:47.19] Ben: So, pre-crisis, I think it was clear that we were starting to see the big banks operating at a massive scale. We’re starting to outperform smaller wealth managers. What do you think happens post-crisis? And do you think this acceleration in digitalization also creates the potential entry point for new players? Maybe more FinTech-oriented players.

Laurence: I think indeed there is an opportunity for smaller banks or FinTech players, to enter the industry and be extremely good at one particular thing — for example, online payments or robot advisory. In one particular field, if you start from scratch and you don’t have the legacy of a large database and a full network, it’s, by definition, an opportunity to be very competitive and very good in one particular line or segment. But, for large banks, I would say — and Citi is focusing on the ultra-high net worth, what we are trying to do is to focus on keeping the full-service offering. That’s very important to us. We’re not trying to be extremely good in one area, but we are trying to continue to provide the full breadth of service. Therefore, when we look at technology and outperformance it’s under a more strategic long-term basis.

[01:05:31.26] Ben: Do you think that we’ll see consolidation as a result of this crisis? I.e., if what we’re seeing in other industries happens in wealth management, there’s a bigger separation in performance between the winners and those that are left behind. Do you think that will lead to consolidation?

Laurence: There should be opportunities as well in that field, and it’s been a trend anywhere, especially in Switzerland, for several years now. If you count the number of small banks, mid banks, and large banks, clearly there is a trend for consolidation. So, I guess that should continue. Whether it creates opportunities because of the current situation? Probably. We can see that, for example, access to lending is still available, but it’s becoming a bit more restrictive. So, I guess, at some point, there will be some difficulties for smaller banks to continue to provide certain services and therefore they could be open to merging. But it also triggers the questions on, when we think about consolidation and we try to merge two teams, two systems, two client database, there is a culture element to it. So, it’s also complicated. So, I guess the M&A activity will continue because the trend had started before, but it’s not that simple to buy a smaller bank and integrate culturally with the systems and the client base. It’s not that simple.

[01:07:25.14] Ben: What are you telling your clients? What advice are you giving your clients about how to position their portfolios and their assets in response to COVID-19? Are you advising them to sit tight, try not to worry too much about the volatility and just hold for the long term, or are you actively getting them to reposition to more defensive assets?

Laurence: So, that’s an interesting question because obviously, the market’s reaction has been quite sudden in March, and we had very limited time to review our recommendations. So, we had just finished our outlook for 2020, for example, which was quite promising — so, we had to do a lot of groundwork trying to understand when we had been in previous situations, if markets tended to recover quickly, if we were in a situation completely new that needed to be reassessed completely. So it took us about two weeks just to reassess the situation, take a bit of perspective. And we are taking always a strategic long-term view when we issue recommendations to our clients and guide them to manage their wealth. For example, advising to remain invested. We feel that trying to time the market in this environment is very tricky, and if you missed the best 10 days of the market over the last years, you could significantly miss out. So, we are telling clients to remain invested, but we’ve increased the quality of the underlying investments. Diversification, which is a very common concept, has never mattered that much than today. But we are also taking a thematic view — I give you an example: investing in private equity today, putting new money at work, giving money to a manager who would be able to invest post-COVID and deploy the money as the opportunity arise, I think could be a good recommendation to look at this space. To try to generate some returns that are less correlated to the traditional markets, I think it’s very good thematic investing. We were very engaged before this crisis in technology, healthcare, digital disruptions — the key themes that we believe will have superior growth going forward because they have their own trends. We continue to focus on, and we commit to invest in them.

Laurence: At the same time, what we are telling clients is that it’s very important to measure the impact of this crisis on the EPS earnings, and I think EPS growth has been revised downwards quite significantly, but it’s not clear yet how much it will hurt in Europe and in the US or Asia because the crisis is evolving at a different pace and economies will reopen at a different timing, and we don’t know whether there will be a second wave, etc. So, what we are telling our clients is to be careful about the equity markets, to invest in high-quality, high-dividend paying stocks and thematic investments, but to be ready to deploy more money along the way, because we might see market lower before it actually turns back. We’ve also advised our clients to explore opportunities in the capital market area — volatility has increased, our clients are trading a lot and by selling volatility, at least short-term is a good way to enter the market at a lower level. So, we are trying to be cautious but and remain invested, but there are some opportunities around volatility and private equity that we are recommending to capture.

Network Effects in Financial Services (#8)

Network Effects in Financial Services, with Evgenia Plotnikova, Martin McCann, Oliver Prill

Network Effects in Financial Services,
w/ Evgenia PLOTNIKOVA, Martin McCANN, Oliver PRILL

This podcast was recorded at FinTECHTalents’19 Festival and in it we’re exploring the potential of unleashing network effects in financial services. Ben Robinson is joined into the conversation by: Evgenia Plotnikova (Principal VC @ Dawn Capital); Martin McCann (CEO at Trade Ledger) and Oliver Prill (CEO at Tide Business Banking).

Full podcast transcript:

 

 
This podcast was recorded at FinTECHTalents’19 Festival, at Printworks, London (www.fintechtalents.com)

What we’re essentially trying to do is create a network of quality data that provides the potential for innovation in terms of services which can be built on top of that data. But the problem we’re solving initially is that convenience and trust problem of both sides of the network. — MM

What we’d like to distinguish within our business is three things — network effects themselves, then the virality factor and economies of scale. […] in my view, you can actually create significant businesses without having network effects -EP

The platform generates a lot of data […] so we invest a lot in data science and machine learning to basically do all non-simplistic decision making. […] Every time you can’t make a simplistic decision, we deploy machine learning and machine learning gets better the more data points you get from different users because the models become whack. — OP

We’re internalizing, but I think other people who sit on our platform can externalize. So it’s too big a problem for anybody to solve, so we’re trying to do the bit that we know how to do really well, which is to organize the data services and provide them so that other people can create other business models on top of that. — MM

But the key for us at this stage, we don’t think too much about, I guess the detail of what the network effect will be. Because if we don’t get the momentum and the traction and the scale, we don’t get the opportunity to create the network effect. — MM

I mean we currently open more business current accounts than Lloyds or RBS group per month on a flow measure, and the reason for that is very simple that the network effects just don’t exist. There used to be a degree of virality, which really was just brand awareness. You would default to the Big 5, because you just didn’t know that was another. — OP

It’s the regulator. It could probably be more market share with network effects — because the winner takes most of the market — which is actually one of the debates we’re having with all the social networks, should the regulator not start to intervene because they have all of us, right? But we fundamentally believe in financial services. There may be niches where this doesn’t apply, but in general, 15 to 20% in any country exposes you to regulatory intervention risk. — OP

Platforms take a while to build. This is very different to a product vertical that you were talking, in Europe with 20+ countries or, you know Revolut that goes into 30–45 markets. Effectively, they are single product or similar product-centric propositions that very rapidly can go across borders because all they do is marginal change. — OP

There is nothing to stop us from creating a monopoly. So we’re not like a financial service provider. Whether we get to do that depends on the decisions we make about building up the business. A lot of that has to go back to what I said earlier about momentum and scale and the ability to keep creating additional value add and value adding services for the participants of the platform, in different regions. — MM

I love the fact that we’re a technology company. I mean, I would never want to be a bank because I think that model has so many constraints with it that you have to work within the system, whereas being a technology company, you’re completely unbounded and you can re-imagine completely what the value proposition in the marketplace looks like. — MM

I’d say in the beginning, it can be poor product that can accelerate network effects. You mentioned LinkedIn, you might remember monster.com. So that kind of became a large business driven by network effects before LinkedIn came. And so I think that’s actually a case in point of eventually poor product falling on its own sword despite the network effects that existed there. And so for me, ultimately, it’s not about sort of internalizing and externalizing. Ultimately it’s about category dominance. And so the way that we think about opportunities to invest is we don’t just look at a market that’s large. We’ll look at a specific value chain and where the business positions itself within that value chain. — EP

Ultimately I wouldn’t say that you necessarily get a huge premium for the network effects. It’s more your ability to have your cost base being linear, whether it’s your revenue is exponential. And so whether it’s network effects that that got you there or whether it’s your virality factors or your go-to-market, ultimately the great businesses will get the right price tag, regardless of what made them get there. — EP

We’ve been raising money, we find that the investors we spoke to honestly couldn’t give a c*** about network effects. All they care about is financial fundamentals and team. That’s it. All they care about is how much money are we currently making? What’s our attraction and how fast are we going to grow our revenue? And when are we going to make profit and how are we going to make profit, and do we have a good team and do we believe we can execute? That’s all they care about. — MM